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THE PROTECTION OF WHALES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A PERSPECTIVE
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY
Howard Scott Schiffman
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans have hunted whales for centuries.' Only within
the last fifty years, however, with many species of cetaceans on
the brink of extinction, has the international community seen
fit to regulate the practice of whaling by treaty.' Today, the
world community views whales and whaling in a very different
context than it did when it ratified the 1948 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the Convention or
Whaling Convention) and created the International Whaling
Commission (IWC).3 So, too, is the framework of international
law, in which concerned states resolve issues relating to the
protection of whales, very different. Specifically, the
environmental and preservationist forces arrayed against the
1. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 28 (1991); see also DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR 1-15
(1987). David Day is a conservationist who has helped lead the fight against the
whaling industry. The book is written from that perspective and is not particularly
concerned with international legal issues. However, the book is frequently cited in
the scholarly literature.
2. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW].
Although there were some limited attempts to regulate the commercial whaling
industry before this date, the 1948 convention was the first comprehensive treaty.
It superseded all prior agreements. The preamble of the convention recognized the
need for an international agreement to preserve the long-term health of the
industry. The ICRW was signed by the United States, Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and South Africa. The treaty came into
effect on November 10, 1948, and was amended in 1956 by the Protocol to the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Nov. 19, 1956, 10 U.S.T.
952, 338 U.N.T.S. 366. The Protocol extended the definition of "whale catcher" to
helicopters and other aircraft. Id. art. I, 10 U.S.T. at 953, 338 U.N.T.S. at 366.
3. ICRW, supra note 2, art. I1, 62 Stat. at 1717-18, 161 U.N.T.S. at 77-78.
The IWC is comprised of one representative from each party that is a member to
the Convention. Id. art. I(1). Article IV provides for the IWC to study the
practice of whaling, collect and analyze data on whale stocks, and report on its
activities. Id. art. IV, 62 Stat. at 1718, 161 U.N.T.S. at 78-80. Article V provides
for the IWC to adopt regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization
of whale resources. Id art. V(1), 62 Stat. at 1718-19, 161 U.N.T.S at 80.
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remaining small minority of whaling states have many more
scientific, legal, and political weapons at their disposal. Several
international treaties and domestic statutes are available to
further the policy goals of those states that have ended their
practice of whaling and now seek to protect whales and other
marine mammals in their natural habitats.4
Despite these international agreements and statutes, the
future of cetacean protection is far from certain. Indeed, recent
trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)5 and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),6 as well as certain provisions of the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),7
4. In 1982 the IWC voted to impose a moratorium on commercial whaling
until more accurate data on whale stocks could be compiled. INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMMISSION, THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING
COMMISSION 20-21 (1983) [hereinafter THIRTY-THImD REPORT OF THE IWC]. The
moratorium has been in effect since 1986. Debora MacKenzie, Whaling Nations
Threaten Unilateral Action, NEW SCIENTIST, July 14, 1990, at 22. For the full text
of the moratorium adopted as paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule to the Convention,
see THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE IWC, supra, at 40; see also Marian N. Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Environmental Affairs, 79 AM. J. INT L. 431, 435 n.4 (1985) (providing the full
text of the moratorium). In 1994, at the 46th annual meeting of the IWC, a whale
sanctuary was established in most of the waters south of 40 degrees south
latitude. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 27-29 (1995) [hereinafter FORTY-FIFTH
REPORT OF THE IWC]. In addition to the actions of the IWC, protection for whales
is also provided for in treaties such as the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 13, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993
U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES], and the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force
Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. In the United States, whales are protected
by legislation passed in the 1970s, particularly the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Convention and Management Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994))
[hereinafter Packwood-Magnuson Amendment or Packwood-Magnuson], the Pelly
Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85
Stat. 786 (1971) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994)) [hereinafter Pelly
Amendment or Pelly], the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
522, § 107, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994)), and
the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884
(1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (1994)).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; see infra note 156 and accompanying text.
6. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA]; see infra note 157 and accompanying
text.
7. UNCLOS, supra note 4, 21 I.L.M. at 1261.
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may actually impede future whale protection policies.
This article is an analysis of the contemporary issues of
whaling in an international legal context. Part H provides a
brief history of whaling and the factors that led to over-
exploitation, and includes an analysis of the failure of the IWC
to effectively regulate whaling. Part III discusses reasons for a
policy of whale protection and the changing policy goals of
states with respect to the regulation of the industry. It
includes a discussion of current status of relevant customary
law. Part IV evaluates potential conflicts between recent
treaties and the policy of whale protection in the United
States. Finally, Part V contains specific recommendations on
how the integration of political, economic, scientific, and legal
measures can promote policy goals. That section concludes by
discussing the future of whale protection within the framework
of international law.
This article advocates a policy of whale preservation,
which has advanced substantially in the last fifty years.
However, there is a potential conflict between the goals of free
trade and the goals of cetacean protection. The use of
unilateral trade sanctions to punish environmentally
destructive conduct is inconsistent with the new trend toward
open markets. States will need to address global problems
multilaterally. International and domestic law will need to
adapt to the economic needs of states in the post-Cold War
world. However, equally important goals of environmental
protection could suffer as a result. A reconciliation of these
divergent goals may prove to be one of the greatest legal and
policy challenges of the next century.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WHALING AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS
A. The Early Days
Whaling began with the Basques in the thirteenth century
and rapidly developed into an international industry as
whalers headed further west in search of more abundant
stocks.8 Whaling responded to the demands of the
marketplace: whale oil provided smokeless lamp fuel and
8. SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 17 (1985).
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whalebones were an essential ingredient in women's fashions
of the times.' Basque whaling essentially ended by the close of
the sixteenth century.0 However, the British and Dutch
whaling industries grew at that time."
The seventeenth century saw whaling come to the North
American colonies in New England and the mid-Atlantic
region.'2 The industry continued to grow; it reached its peak
in the mid-1800s, employing 70,000 people and nearly 729
ships. 3 North American whaling was truly global in that its
voyages extended as far as South America, Australia, and New
Zealand.'4 A second whaling industry developed on the west
coast of the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth
century to take better advantage of the whaling grounds in the
Pacific and meet the growing needs of California. 5
Later on, the United States would do its part to protect
whales from commercial whaling, especially after electric lights
replaced whale oil and other commercial uses of whales
declined in importance. Today, the United States remains at
the forefront of that movement.
In other parts of the world, however, commercial uses of
whales remained important. In the early twentieth century, as
American whaling declined, Norway began to take advantage
of new technological developments such as steam engines and
more effective harpoons that made the hunt easier." Norway
expanded its geographic reach as well; it established its first
9. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 28.
10. Id. The technology developed by the Basques was adopted and improved
upon by other states. The decline of Basque whaling was probably due, at least in
part, to the competition of these other states. See id.
11. Id. at 28; see also PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
WHALING 65-68 (1985).
12. E.J. SLIPJER, WHALES 25 (A.J. Promerans trans., Basic Books 1962) (1958);
Barbara Lipton, Whaling Days in New Jersey, NEWARK MUSEUM Q., Spring-
Summer 1975, at 3, 3-4; James E. Scarf, The International Management of
Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment (Part One), 6
ECOLOGY L.Q. 326, 345 (1977).
13. Scarff, supra note 12, at 345; David 0. Hill, Vanishing Giants, AUDUBON,
Jan. 1975, at 56, 85; see also KARL BRANDT, WHALE OIL: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
50 (1940).
14. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 29.
15. Scarff, supra note 12, at 345; see Hill, supra note 13, at 79.
16. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 29; see also J.N. TONNESSEN & A.O.
JOHNSEN, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING 23-32 (R.I. Christophersen trans., C.
Hurst & Co. 1982) (1970).
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land-based whaling station in Antarctica in 1904.'7 Norway
has become a stalwart among twentieth century whaling
nations, along with Japan and Iceland.
The early twentieth century saw the industry become
highly efficient at killing whales. Between 1910 and 1914
annual whale catches were in the tens of thousands. 18 World
War I provided a brief respite for whales because many vessels
in the whale hunts were converted for military use. 9 But the
break proved to be short-lived. The "golden years" of whaling
were yet to come.
Among the most productive years (or the most destructive,
from the whales' perspective) were the 1920s and 1930s.2"
Because of the demand for whale oil for cosmetics and as a
high-quality lubricant, whale oil production increased almost
tenfold between 1920 and 1931.21 From 1918 through 1931
there had been a limited attempt to regulate commercial
whaling to maintain the availability of sizable numbers of
particular species, but the efforts were quite ineffective.' In
1927, at the Whaling Committee of the International Council
17. BIRNIE, supra note 11, at 72; see J.R. Rowland, The Treaty Regime and
the Politics of the Consultative Parties, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 11, 22-23
(Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K Chopra eds., 1988). See generally TONNESSEN
& JOHNSEN, supra note 16, at 178-82. Land stations and "floating factories" were
used to facilitate the processing of whales. Despite the inhospitable seas, the
Antarctic was a major center for whale harvesting and processing. Fin whales
were found in particularly large numbers there. Scarf, supra note 12, at 346-47.
18. BIRNIE, supra note 11, at 73.
19. Scarff, supra note 12, at 347. Despite the reduced hunt, whaling did
continue during the war and approximately 10,000 whales were taken in each year
of the conflict. Id.
20. See DAY, supra note 1, at 15; Scarff, supra note 12, at 347.
21. Scarff, supra note 12, at 347; see also GEORGE SMALL, THE BLUE WHALE
14 (1971); SLIPJER, supra note 12, at 36-44 (detailing whale oil products). One
factor that facilitated this dramatic increase in the production of whale oil was the
technological development of the stem slipway by the Norwegians in 1925.
TONNESSEN & JOHNSEN, supra note 16, at 265-66. The stern slipway allowed
whalers to haul whales on board factory ships in all but the roughest seas. SMALL,
supra, at 13. This invention enabled factory ships to process whales much more
efficiently, and farther from land. Id. at 14.
22. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 30. The first convention for the
regulation of whaling was signed on September 24, 1931; however, its scope was
very limited. It applied only to baleen whales. Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, art. 2, 49 Stat. 3079, 3085, 155 L.N.T.S. 349, 357.
"Immature" and "undersized" whales were granted protection but those terms were
never defined. Id. art. 5. No overall catch quotas were established. DOUGLAS M.
JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 399 (1965).
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for the Exploration of the Sea, the Norwegian delegate
proposed that whaling countries prohibit the further expansion
of whaling and institute a licensing system." The 1931
Whaling Convention required states to communicate statistical
data about their catches to The International Bureau of
Whaling Statistics.'
In 1932, the whaling industry attempted to regulate itself
because it was producing more whale products than the
market could bear; prices and profits were down sharply.25
The companies that actively engaged in whaling agreed to
limit the production of whale oil and to set catch quotas for
certain species.2" At this time, Norway and Great Britain,
which accounted for ninety-five percent of the world catch,
reached a bilateral agreement imposing restraints on their
industries." The Norwegian government initiated conferences
23. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 30.
24. Id. Article 10 of the 1931 Convention required each member state to
obtain-
[T]he most complete biological information practicable with regard to each
whale taken, and in any case on the following points:
(a) Date of taking;




Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 22, art. 10(a)-(e), 49 Stat. at
3087, 155 L.N.T.S. at 359. Article 12 required this information to be
communicated to the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics in Oslo. Id. art.
12, 49 Stat. at 3089, 155 L.N.T.S. at 361. The purpose of the International Bureau
for Whaling Statistics was to record accurate data about whale harvesting for
future conservation policies. See JOHNSTON, supra note 22, at 399.
25. JOHNSTON, supra note 22, at 350.
26. Scarff, supra note 12, at 350. This was an application of the basic
economics principle of supply and demand. A parallel may be drawn between the
whaling industry of the 1930s and the modem practice of the OPEC oil cartel,
which regularly seeks to remedy price declines by reducing supply. The concern, at
this stage in the history of whaling, was clearly for the long-term health of the
industry. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
27. Id. This agreement between Norway and Great Britain gave the
imprimatur of international law to what was being attempted by business
practices and the informal agreements of industrialists. The need for the treaty,
however, implies the competitive rather than collusive nature of the whaling
industry. If market forces alone could have reduced whale catches, they probably
would have done so. This agreement would later prove to be an important factor
in the decision to establish the International Whaling Commission, and its
ultimate failure to manage the finite resource of whales. It should be noted that
this factor has nothing at all to do with environmental protection or the "Save the
Whales" movement.
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that were held in 1937, 1938, and 1939.' These conferences
established the precedent for annual international conferences
on whale preservation.
B. The International Whaling Commission
Despite those early, rather timid and ineffective attempts
at regulation, the virtually unrestrained slaughter of whales
continued. This slaughter led not only to the collapse of whale
stocks virtually everywhere in the world, but drove many
species to the brink of extinction. 9 In late 1946 the United
States called for a comprehensive international conference on
whaling."0 At that time no comprehensive treaty governed the
international law of the sea; it only recognized the territorial
sea and the high seas."' The high seas were open to
unregulated fishing and whaling. Therefore, any attempt to
preserve whale stocks had to be through an international
agreement specifically for that purpose.
The IWC was the primary product of the Convention. 2
Concern with protecting the interests of whaling states
28. Id. For a then-contemporary discussion of these early whaling conferences,
see L. Larry Leonard, Recent Negotiations Toward the International Regulation of
Whaling, 35 AM. J. INTL L. 90 (1941).
29. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 32. Among the species that were
driven to the brink of extinction were the gray, right, bowhead, and northern
humpback whales. Scarff, supra note 12, at 346.
30. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 33. The United States convened the
Whaling Conference in Washington, D.C. on November 20, 1946. Scarff, supra note
12, at 352. The Conference was convened in the general postwar spirit of
international cooperation and the disappointing 1945-1946 whaling season. Id. The
first discussion of a Washington Conference can be traced to 1944 in a telegram
between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the United States Ambassador to the
United Kingdom, John G. Winant. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the
Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Jan. 4, 1944, reprinted in 2 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, at 933 (1967). In
the telegram, Secretary Hull suggested that a Washington Conference would "offer
an opportunity of formulating in the near future a program based on sound
principles of conservation that would give effective protection to existing stock of
whales especially in relation to our national requirements of certain whale oil for
industrial and military uses." Id.
31. BIRNIE, supra note 11, at 265; D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 33.
The territorial sea was largely considered an extension of sovereign territory and
the high seas were open at the time to unregulated fishing. There was no formal
requirement of high seas use with "due regard" as exists under UNCLOS.
UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 87(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
32. ICRW, supra note 2, arts. III-VII, 62 Stat. at 1717-19, 161 U.N.T.S. at 76-
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dominated the early days of the IWC, at the expense of whales.
Ecologist David Day vividly describes the early days of the
IWC:
Like some exclusive big game shooting club, the members of
the IWC since 1948 came together once a year before the
opening of the killing season. They sat around a big table and
smoked cigars, they had drinks in the bar and compared
profits and talked of the good old days when the vast herds of
great blue whales made life easy. Then they sat down at the
table and bargained until they agreed among themselves
what the sporting number of whales to be bagged [that] year
would be. The quota was based on virtually non-existent
science and a lot of wishful thinking. The hunt was a kind of
'gentlemen's agreement' between nations to abide by sporting
rules: an exact date for the opening of the season, a ban on
the killing of nursing mothers and undersized whales, and an
immediate end to the killing when the quota was reached.33
Day's characterization of the IWC's quota system as a
"gentlemen's agreement" was probably correct under an inter-
national legal analysis. 4 Although multilateral international
agreements are often fraught with enforcement problems, one
can make a strong argument that the IWC's proclamation,
ratified in 1947, and all of its subsequent quota decisions, were
never intended to have the full force and effect of a binding
law.
Several factors indicate the lack of legal obligation in the
Convention. First, there is a liberal provision for member
states that object to a quota to "opt out" upon timely notifica-
tion.35 Thus, any state that chooses to exercise its right to ob-
ject to the quota is not bound by it.3" Second, there is obvi-
33. DAY, supra note 1, at 27.
34. See id.
35. ICRW, supra note 2, art. V(3), 62 Stat. at 1719, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80-82.
36. Id. Although reservations are not uncommon in international law, the res-
ervations permitted here are puzzling. Paragraph 2 of article V specifically states
that "[any] amendments of the Schedule ... shall be such as are necessary to
carry out the objectives and purpose of this Convention.. . ." Id. art. V(2)(a), 62
Stat. at 1719, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80 (emphasis added). Reservations to conventions
are not usually permitted where they defeat the object and purpose of the agree-
ment. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19(c),
1155 U.N.T.S. 330, 337 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention
was not in force at the time the Whaling Convention was signed and is non-retro-
active. It is, however, considered to be declaratory of custom in most areas of
312 [Vol. XXII:2
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ously no requirement that a state be a member to the Conven-
tion in the first instance, nor are members prevented from
withdrawing if they give timely notification. 7 Finally, even
states that are parties to the Convention, and do not object to
the quota schedules, may effectively be exempted from them if
they grant nationals under their jurisdiction a special permit
for "scientific research." 8
In fairness to the drafters, there is some evidence that the
members of the IWC did intend for the quotas to be binding.
The language of a typical quota agreement seems to so indi-
cate. For example, the following quota was set at the twenty-
eighth annual meeting of the Convention:
The number of whales taken in the North Pacific Ocean and
dependent waters in 1977 shall not exceed the following lim-
its:
Sperm Whales - males 4320
Sperm Whales - females 2880
Bryde's Whales 1000
Minke Whales (Western Stock) 541
Minke Whales (remainder of
the North Pacific) 0 pending a
satisfactory
treaty law.
37. ICRW, supra note 2, art. XI, 62 Stat. at 1721, 161 U.N.T.S. at 86. But see
LYSTER, supra note 8, at 4:
The greater the number of participants in the formulation of a treaty,
the weaker or more ambiguous its provisions are likely to be since they
have to reflect compromises making them acceptable to every State in-
volved. Wildlife treaties, which are often intended to attract a large num-
ber of Parties, are especially exposed to this risk.
Id. Most whaling nations remain members of the IWC so that their voice can be
heard. The reservation provision induces dissenter states to stay as members. See
id. at 9.
38. ICRW, supra note 2, art. VIII(l), 62 Stat. at 1719-20, 161 U.N.T.S. at 82.
Japan and Norway have frequently invoked this provision to circumvent the cur-
rent commercial whaling moratorium. Some of the meat of whales captured in
scientific whaling may be sold commercially. See generally MacKenzie, supra note
4, at 22; DNA Tests for Suspect Whale Trade, SEA FRONTIERS, Aug. 1994, at 11.
The IWC decided in 1994 that whale meat derived from research whaling should
not be exported. FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 44-45. Previ-
ously 49% could be exported. Report of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, para. 7 (1994) (unpublished summary report, unofficial
distribution of the United States National Marine Fisheries Service, on file with
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter NMFS Report].
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estimate
of stock size 9
Note that the quota provision contains the word "shall,"4
which is indicative of legal obligation. Such unequivocal lan-
guage would tend to indicate that the drafters intended the
text to be legally binding.
Furthermore, article X of the Convention requires member
states whose representatives signed the instrument to ratify
the Convention.4' The requirements of signatures and ratifica-
tion have traditionally been expressions of consent to be bound
in international law.42 The preamble also contains language
that provides for neutral inspectors on whaling ships to moni-
tor compliance43 and prosecution for transgressors by the gov-
ernment having jurisdiction over the offense." In addition,
there is the general principle of international law-pacta sunt
servanda-which provides that every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.45 Finally, there is a basic principle of treaty interpreta-
tion that requires a treaty to be "interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty and in their context in light of its object and pur-
pose."4
6
39. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention of
1946, adopted June 25, 1976, 12, 27 U.S.T. 4015, 4018, 1123 U.N.T.S. 277, 279.
Even stricter language is found in some cases, for example, "It is forbidden to
take or kill any sperm whale over 45 feet (13.7 metres) in length in the Southern
Hemisphere north of 40"S latitude during the months of October to January inclu-
sive." Id. I 15(c), 27 U.S.T. at 4019, 1123 U.N.T.S. at 280.
40. Id. 12.
41. ICRW, supra note 2, art. X(1), 62 Stat. at 1720, 161 U.N.T.S. at 84.
42. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, arts. 12, 14, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 335;
LYSTER, supra note 8, at 5-6. See generally LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 439-41 (3d ed. 1993).
43. See ICRW, supra note 2, sched. 1(a), 62 Stat. at 1723, 161 U.N.T.S. at 90.
44. Paragraph 2 of article IX provides that "[n]o bonus . . . shall be paid to
the gunners and crews of whale catchers in respect of any whales the taking of
which is forbidden by this Convention." Id. art. X(2), 62 Stat. at 1720, 161
U.N.T.S. at 84. Paragraph 4 requires each government to inform the IWC of each
infraction and subsequent punishment. Id. art. X(4).
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339. See
generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 20-21.
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. The
legal rules concerning interpretation of treaties in the Vienna Convention passed
without a dissenting vote and may be considered declaratory of existing law. See
generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 475-78.
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Despite the fact that the Convention discussed the punish-
ment of infractions, its enforcement mechanism was quite poor.
The proof is in the results: "[uinder the aegis of the IWC dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, more whales were killed than ever
before."' It was not until the 1970s that the tide began to
turn in favor of whale conservation, when political attitudes
toward whales began to change and a new concern for global
ecology began to take root.4"
C. Additional Protective Measures
In the early 1970s the United States began to emerge as a
champion of environmental issues and, as a result, marine
mammal protection benefited considerably.4" In 1972 the U.S.
Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which
protected whales and dolphins within U.S. waters.0 In 1973
the United States enacted the Endangered Species Act.5' The
Endangered Species Act not only protects designated endan-
gered species and their habitats, but also closes the U.S. mar-
ket to whale products. 2 Also in 1973, the Convention on
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), which the United States championed, was opened for
signature.53 It entered into force on July 1, 1975."4 CITES
closed many international markets to whale products as well
as those of many other endangered species.55
47. DAY, supra note 1, at 29. Day contrasts the numbers of whales caught
before the IWC existed with those afterwards. "In 1933, when virtually no restric-
tions existed, 30,000 whales were killed; in 1962 under the IWC, nearly 67,000
whales were killed." Id.
48. See D'Amato and Chopra, supra note 1, at 38.
49. See H.R. Con. Res. 54, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (providing, in its pre-
amble, a historical analysis of the United States commitment to whale preserva-
tion). Although by the 1970s the United States was on the side of the anti-whal-
ing forces on the issue of commercial whaling, it was and remains an advocate for
aboriginal whaling. Aboriginal whaling is a native right to whaling that belongs to
indigenous peoples, such as the Inuit. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994) (exempting
Alaskan natives from the provisions of the Endangered Species Act).
50. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1407 (1994)).
51. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.
884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)-(d).
53. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. at 243.
54. Id.
55. See DAY, supra note 1, at 30-31. But see DAVID S. FAVRE, INTEINATIONAL
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Most importantly, in the early 1970s debate began in the
U.S. Congress about fishery conservation that ultimately led to
the enactment of legislation which directly addressed the in-
ability of the IWC to effectively regulate whale resources. The
Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967
(Pelly Amendment or Pelly)" enables the Secretary of Com-
merce to certify to the President any foreign nations for sanc-
tions that "diminish the effectiveness of an international fish-
ery conservation program."57 After such certification the Pres-
ident may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to embargo the
fish or wildlife products of the offending nation as a punitive
measure.58 Congress hoped the certification procedure provid-
ed in the Pelly Amendment would serve as a threat to poten-
tial violators of international fishery conservation agree-
ments.59 If the threat of sanctions did not have the desired
deterrent effect, then the sanctions themselves, if imposed,
would constitute punishment."
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976 (Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment or Packwood-Magnuson) 6' afforded whales addi-
tional protection. Although the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments are similar, they also differ in that the latter
specifically mentions whales as beneficiaries of the statute.62
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO CITES 91 (1989) ('[UInlike other
highly visible animals such as the elephant or the big cats, CITES has not been
the primary focus point of the international [whaling] debate.... CITES has
played a supportive role in seeking to protect the whales.").
56. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994). Although the Pelly Amendment clearly applied to
whales and addressed the failures of the IWC, its original impetus was the Inter-
national Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Feb. 8, 1949, 1 U.S.T.
477, 157 U.N.T.S. 157 (entered into force July 3, 1950), and its failure to ade-
quately conserve the Atlantic Salmon. For congressional intent with respect to the
protection of whales at the time of the Pelly debate, see 117 CONG. REC. 34,752
(1971) (statement of Rep. Pelly).
57. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1994).
58. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4) (1994).
59. See 117 CONG. REc. 34,752 (1971) (statement of Rep. Pelly).
60. 117 CONG. REC. 34,753 (1971) (statement of Rep. Pelly); Melinda K Blatt,
Case Note, Woe for the Whales: Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986), 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 1285, 1290 (1987).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994).
62. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment provides:
The term "certification" means a certification made by the Secretary that
nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fish-
ing operations or engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the ef-
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The penalty provided in the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
is also different-while Pelly involves an embargo of fish or
wildlife products, Packwood-Magnuson reduces the allowable
catch of fish in U.S. waters (200 nautical mile Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone) by the offending nation "by not less than 50 per-
cent.'
The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments effective-
ly became the international enforcement arm of the IWC. 4 In
the early 1980s an organizational change occurred on the IWC
that paved the way for the current commercial whaling mora-
torium.65 Specifically, in 1982 the number of states that were
members of the IWC grew to thirty-seven.66 This number in-
cluded many small non-whaling states that ostensibly joined at
the behest of environmental groups to take a stand against
whaling."
In 1982, bowing to environmental group pressure, the IWC
passed an indefinite moratorium (zero catch-limit) on all com-
mercial whaling.6 " This moratorium continued to allow scien-
fectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
A certification under this section shall also be deemed a certification for
the purposes of section 1978(a) of Title 22.
16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B).
64. DAY, supra note 1, at 94. Day characterizes the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment as the "Save the Whale movement's most powerful weapon." Id. The
sanction applied to any nation that violated IWC regulations, regardless of wheth-
er or not they were a member of the IWC. Id. In actual practice, however, states
have almost never been certified for sanctions by the Secretary of Commerce and
the reduction of fishing privileges in American waters has only been imposed once.
See Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Reporting
on Japanese Whaling Activities, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 438 (Apr. 6, 1988).
In 1993, in a letter to Congress, President Clinton condemned Norway for its
decision to resume harvesting of minke whales, but indicated that sanctions would
be imposed only as a last resort. Message to the Congress on Whaling Activities
of Norway, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 1684 (Oct. 4, 1993). No sanctions were ultimately
imposed. The embargo of fishery products, provided for in the Pelly Amendment,
has never been imposed for a violation of an IWC regulation.
65. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 238 (2d ed. 1988).
66. DAY, supra note 1, at 96.
67. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 65, at 238; DAY, supra note 1, at 96. For
a discussion of the ideological transformation of the IWC, see Patricia Birnie, The
Role of Developing Countries in Nudging the International Whaling Commission
from Regulating Whaling to Encouraging Nonconsumptive Uses of Whales, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 937 (1985).
68. THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 20. For a full text of
the moratorium, see id. at 40. In 1994, the IWC passed a resolution establishing a
protective whale sanctuary, as an adjunct to the moratorium, in the waters south
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tific whaling and aboriginal whaling. One of the factors that
led to the moratorium was a letter from President Ronald
Reagan to the 1981 meeting of the IWC. In this letter the
President indicated the concern of the U.S. government regard-
ing the insufficient data on whale stocks.69 The letter support-
ed the proposal for a moratorium. 0
Upon the passage of the moratorium, four whaling states,
Japan, Norway, Peru, and the former Soviet Union, promptly
filed objections.7 ' Peru quickly withdrew its objection under
the direct threat of U.S. sanctions.72 The remaining three
were eligible to be certified for sanctions under Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson if they continued their current whaling
practices. Under the Whaling Convention, their timely objec-
tions allowed these three states to "opt out" of the moratori-
um.
73
Japan, seeking to avoid sanctions by the United States,
entered into a series of negotiations with the Reagan Adminis-
tration to exempt it from the reach of the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments. 4 They were largely successfil in
of 40 degrees south latitude. See FORTY-FIFrH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4,
at 27-29, 45-46.
69. President's Message to the International Whaling Commission, 1981 PUB.
PAPRuS 634 (July 17, 1981).
70. Id.
71. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, THIRTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL WHALING CODMISSION 29 (1984).
72. Id. Peru withdrew its objection in 1984 when the United States threat-
ened to impose trade sanctions. DAY, supra note 1, at 87. It gave up whaling
operations entirely in 1986. Id. at 81.
73. ICRW, supra note 2, art. V(3), 62 Stat. at 1719, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80-82.
74. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, in an exchange of letters with
Minister Yasushi Murazumi, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Japan, promised that
the United States would refrain from certifying Japan under Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson if Japan agreed to harvest only a finite number of sperm whales (a
zero-quota was in effect) and cease all commercial whaling operations by 1988.
American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (D.D.C.) (referring
to a document entitled "Summary of Discussions on Commercial Sperm Whaling in
the Western Division Stock of the North Pacific, Nov. 1-12, 1984, Washington,
D.C."), affd, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nor. Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (5-4 decision). The executive side-
agreement with Japan was seen by American conservation groups as a frustration
of not only the IWC moratorium, but also a derogation of executive duty under
what they believed was mandatory language, compelling certification under Pelly
and Packwood-Magnuson. Id. at 1401. These conservation groups brought an action
in federal court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Secretary Baldrige to certi-
fy Japan. I& at 1400. Judge Charles R. Richey of the District Court in the Dis-
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eliminating any real economic or political pain as a result of
continuing their destructive whaling practices.
The resulting litigation highlighted a flaw in the scheme to
use domestic legislation to enforce IWC regulations. The Su-
preme Court held in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Ceta-
cean Society that the language of Packwood-Magnuson and
Pelly providing for sanctions was discretionary and non-man-
datory.75 That case also proved that there is no substitute for
real international cooperation where the protection of a deli-
cate resource such as marine mammals is concerned.
Whales and other marine mammals also receive some
protection from the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement
Act, enacted in 1992. 7" This Act is the implementing legisla-
tion of a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling
for an end to large-scale pelagic driftnets."
trict of Columbia granted the mandamus. In so doing, he held that the language
contained in Packwood-Magnuson was mandatory and nondiscretionary concerning
the duty of the Secretary of Commerce to certify for sanctions those nations that
"diminish the effectiveness of' an international fishery agreement or whaling con-
vention agreement. Id. at 1411 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1)). The court of appeals
affirmed. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The
opinions of the lower courts, however, were not adopted by the Supreme Court.
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
75. 478 U.S. at 222. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision,
concluding that the language of the statute regarding the level of discretion vested
in the Secretary of Commerce was unapparent. Where "a statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the question at issue, our longstanding practice is to defer
to the 'executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer. . . ." Id. at 233 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). In the dissenting opinion, Justice
Marshall criticized the opinion for allowing the executive branch to impose a pen-
alty not authorized by the statute, id. at 245 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and possi-
bly frustrating the intention of Congress in the process, id. at 246 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinion alluded to the
fact that the actions of the executive, standing alone, could be construed as defeat-
ing the object and purpose of the IWC moratorium. See generally Blatt, supra note
60, at 1293; Erin K. Flory, Comment, Construing the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments: The D.C. Circuit Court Harpoons Executive Discretion, 61
WASH. L. REV. 631, 637-39 (1986); Leich, supra note 4, at 434-38.
76. High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106
Stat. 4900 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1826a-1826c (1994)). The practice of large-scale
driftnet fishing is particularly dangerous to large marine mammals which get
caught in the nets and cannot free themselves to get to the surface to breathe. In
these cases, the death of marine mammals is considered "incidental" to the ordi-
nary fishing operations. Although largely abated, the incidental deaths of marine
mammals is still tolerated in the context of certain fishing activities. See infra
note 174.
77. Large-Scale Pelagic Drift-Net Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine
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The difficulties of enforcement presented by quotas and
the moratorium underscores a problem central to international
law. Absent a strong central authority, states will comply only
to the extent that they perceive it is in their self-interest to do
so. The destruction of whales is a classic example of the "trage-
dy of the commons."78 It is naive to think that countries that
employ large numbers of their citizens in the whaling industry
will be persuaded by a long-term "save the whales" argument.
Yet, in tracing the history of whaling one can discern a clear
trend from the wanton destruction of a very special resource
with virtually no expressions of concern, to a nearly universal
attitude today that killing whales is simply wrong.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY
A. Why Save Whales?
At the heart of the policy debate between the pro-whaling
forces and those that oppose whaling are questions about
whales themselves. If the commercial interests of whalers are
to be superseded by environmental concerns, then opponents of
whaling should be prepared to articulate solid reasons for the
preservation of whales. The trend toward whale protection has
been considerable. Indeed, one can argue that the "burden of
proof' is now on the whalers to show that their commercial
interests are superior to the rights of whales and other marine
mammals to live in peace. Nevertheless, proponents of ending
the killing of whales present an excellent argument that
whales deserve protection from man because they are highly
intelligent, sentient beings who are capable of communica-
tion.79
The large brain size of whales and other marine mammals
is often cited to prove their intelligence." Another factor that
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, GA. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm.,
46th Sess., 79th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 147, U.N. Doc. A/46149 (1991). The
resolution called for a reduction and ultimate moratorium on large-scale driftnet
fishing on the high seas by December 31, 1992. Id. %1 3(c).
78. See Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244
(1968). Fisheries are a common property natural resource. Because of this common
property nature there is a tendency for fish stocks to be harvested above biologi-
cally optimum levels. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 65, at 224-26.
79. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 21-22; see DAY, supra note 1, at 152.
The mental powers of whales and dolphins have been the subject of much study
since World War II. Id.
80. See, e.g., DAY, supra note 1, at 152. The brain size of some species of
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indicates intelligence is that killer whales and other toothed
species hunt in a systematic and cooperative way,s' demon-
strating their mental abilities by successfully hunting other
highly intelligent marine mammals such as seals and porpois-
es.82 This implies the evolutionary maxim of "survival of the
fittest" in that only the most intelligent whales could out-smart
a similarly intelligent species."
Perhaps the best evidence of cetacean intelligence is their
ability to communicate." Research has indicated that each
pod of killer whale communicates in its own dialect."5 The
basis for this conclusion was a comparison of the sounds of
whales in captivity with those of the members of their native
pods. 6 Whale pods are social units that are indicative of com-
munity.8 7
In addition to civilian research, the U.S. Navy has ob-
served that four species of whales vocalize in the low frequency
bands that the Navy records with its Integrated Undersea
Surveillance System (IUSS).' The IUSS records data from a
network of underwater acoustical sensors placed across the
whale is six times larger than a human brain. Id.
81. See Glen Martin, Killer Culture, DISCOVER, Dec. 1993, at 110, 113. Al-
though humpback whales and others are not toothed, they are widely considered
to be intelligent. The study of humpback whale songs has provided our best in-
sight into the mental capacities of whales. ERICH HOYT, ORCA: THE WHALE
CALLED KILLER 45 (rev. ed. 1990). Humpbacks are intelligent enough to memorize
the order of sounds, as well as modifications they hear going on around them. Id.
Moreover, they can store this information for at least six months. Id.
82. Martin, supra note 81, at 113.
83. Id. Survival of the fittest, or the smartest, was dramatically demonstrated
when Icelandic killer whales fed on herring until the local herring industry ap-
pealed to the U.S. Navy to intervene. HOYT, supra note 81, at 165. The killer
whales promptly changed their diet to exclude herring! Id. "Orca learns - and
learns quickly." Id. at 166.
84. Martin, supra note 81, at 113. It is now well settled that toothed whales
use communication to hunt. See HOYT, supra note 81, at 43; see also Alexandra
Morton, Life Among the Whales, SMITHSONIAN, Nov. 1994, at 46, 48. Biologist
Alexandra Morton spent 15 years following pods of killer whales in the wild. Id.
at 47.
85. Morton, supra note 84, at 48.
86. Id.; HOYT, supra note 81, at 46 ("[O]rca calves probably mimic their pod-
mates to perpetuate a set of signals unique to their social group, by which they
could recognize one another at a distance.").
87. HOYT, supra note 81, at 12, 151; D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 22.
88. Lisa M. FitzGerald, Eavesdropping on Ocean Sounds, SEA FRONTIERS,
May-June 1994, at 8.
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seafloors of the northern Pacific and Atlantic oceans. 9 The
Navy's goal with IUSS is to isolate and distinguish biological
and geological noise so that it can better pursue its mis-
sions. The data about whale communication is being shared
with civilian researchers to understand better the meaning of
whale whistles and songs.9
Another argument for whale preservation is the fragility of
their life cycle. Specifically, they have low birth-rates and long
gestation periods. 2 Normally only one calf at a time is born to
a mother and the gestation period is usually one year. 3 The
gestation period for sperm whales is sixteen months.' Calves
are born quite large and the interval between successive births
may be a year in some species and as long as three years in
others." In many large species the females do not become re-
impregnated until their young are weaned.96 For this reason
these whales rarely reproduce more than once every two
years.97 Since the large whales have a life expectancy of from
thirty to forty years, a female can give birth to between ten
and twelve calves at most during her lifetime.9" The low
birth-rate is also attributable to the low natural death rate of
whales:99 unlike many species that can reproduce rapidly, na-
ture compensated the whale's low birth rate with a low death
rate.
Any policy debate of this issue must balance the reasons
for protecting whales with the benefits derived from the prod-
ucts of whaling. After all, if whale oil were found to contain
powerful medicinal properties that could cure cancer or heart
89. Id.
90. Id. The key Navy mission that utilizes IUSS is anti-submarine warfare.
Id.
91. See id.
92. See GLOBAL MARINE BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 40 (Elliot A. Norse ed., 1993).
The slow reproduction of marine mammals is specifically enumerated as a reason
for the implementation of the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-582, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4900 (1992).
93. William E. Schevill, Cetacea, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCES 205, 207 (Peter Gray ed., 1961).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 3 VAN NOSTRAND'S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 3323 (Douglas M. Considine
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disease, it would change policy objectives considerably. Unfor-
tunately for the whaling industry, no such benefit has yet been
discovered. People can consume whale meat directly, but the
common uses of whale products include chicken feed, cattle
fodder, fertilizer, car wax, shoe polish, lipstick and other cos-
metics, margarine, and cat and dog food.' Perhaps the
strongest argument for the continuation or resumption of com-
mercial whaling is that it provides employment for citizens in
those few countries that maintain the industry. If it is morally
repugnant to kill whales, the fact that people earn a living
killing whales should not decide the argument. Our modern
society provides a panoply of other jobs. Indeed, as is suggested
later on, whale-watching has become a booming tourist attrac-
tion. It is an example of how the economic displacement of a
whaling ban could be effectively addressed.
Even if policy makers ultimately determine that whales
are not deserving of afrmative steps to protect them, then the
natural question remains: Do they simply have the right to be
left alone by human beings? Does the answer to this question
change when we consider the man-made problems of pollution
and depleted food supplies that challenge whales' existence
before they ever face the harpoon?' The answer to this
question may be emerging in international law, and may be
found in an examination of the changes of attitudes and poli-
cies toward whales over time.
B. The Emergence of Whale Protection as a Moral and Juridi-
cal Concept
If a race of human beings was hunted and slaughtered we
would clearly define and condemn such an act as genocide.
Such acts would trigger fundamental rights granted in human
rights treaties and invoke parallels to the Nazi Holocaust and
other atrocities. D'Amato and Chopra posit the following query:
"To be sure, whales are not human, but are they 'less' than
human?"0 2 As one traces the attitudes toward whales from
100. Joan McIntyre, Let Us Act, in MIND IN THE WATERS 224 (Joan McIntyre
ed., 1974).
101. Patricia Chisholm, Prince of the Tides: Nations Squabble over the Fate of
Whales, MACLEAN'S, June 14, 1993, at 50, 50.
102. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 27.
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the early days of the first hunts up through the modern envi-
ronmental movement, a ring of morality seems to grow louder
in the background.' 3 As a result of this trend, whales may
indeed be acquiring "right-holder" status in international
law."" Apart from whatever protection they may receive from
treaties and statutes, their right to life may be emerging as
customary law.'0 5
One cannot consider the issue of whether or not whales
are acquiring their own set of rights in international law in a
vacuum. Instead, we must analyze it in the context of the
"rights of nature" in general. The whaling issue is a particular-
ly meaningful one to explore this concept, because whales have
received so much attention and the volume of the debate is so
loud. In their natural element they are beautiful, huge yet
graceful. If whales are in fact acquiring legal rights then they
are in the forefront of non-human species to do so. Certainly a
debate over the rights of cockroaches would not resonate as
loudly.
A review of the international environmental instruments
of the last century show a step-by-step development toward a
recognition of the intrinsic rights of nature.' Specifically,
they show a trend toward biocentrism, which is the intrinsic
rights of living things.0 7 Biocentrism can be contrasted with
anthropocentrism, the latter concept assuming a superiority of
103. Id. at 23-28.
104. Id. at 51.
105. Id. at 28. For a description of the necessary elements of customary inter-
national law, see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. See
generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 27). There are two distinct
elements that constitute customary international law. First, there must be a "gen-
eral practice" and second, that practice must be accepted as law (opinio juris) in
the international community. I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(b).
106. See Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, Taking Nature's Rights Seri-
ously: The Long Way to Biocentrism in Environmental Law, 6 GEO. INA ENVTL.
L. REv. 545, 568 (1994).
107. Id. at 576-79. It is prohibitive to reproduce here the exhaustive list of
treaties examined by the authors to show the various stages of the development of
biocentrism. However, at the earliest end of the spectrum, where virtually no
rights of nature are recognized, is the first Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing, supra note 22, 49 Stat. at 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. at 349. At the latter end, show-
ing a high degree of biocentrism, is the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened
for signature June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/130/7, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992)
[hereinafter Biodiversity Convention].
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human interest in nature. °8 Anthropocentrism is a utilitar-
ian concern; that is, nature has rights only to the extent hu-
man beings ultimately benefit from a recognition and protec-
tion of those rights. °9 Since the theory of biocentrism recog-
nizes the intrinsic value of all living things, it can serve as a
starting point to discuss the rights of certain orders or species
in international law."0
There is nothing under a biocentrism perspective that
precludes natural competition between species. An advocate of
biocentrism would likely admit that the extinction of some
species through natural selection may be inevitable. However,
he or she would demand that the rules of the game be fair."'
The logical conclusion that flows from the theory of
biocentrism may be that the holder of rights can take recourse
to the legal system when those rights are violated."2 If so,
novel questions of civil procedure will arise as to who will have
standing to assert those rights.
C. The Rights of Whales: A Claim of Custom
D'Amato and Chopra have analyzed the history of whaling
and divided the progressive acquisition of whales' rights into
five preliminary stages. Through their analysis, they suggest
the existence of a sixth stage: that whales may be acquiring an
entitlement to live and be left alone under customary inter-
national law."' Their comprehensive analysis appears to be
the best such survey attempted on the development of custom-
ary law toward recognizing the rights of whales and is worthy
of review. It is useful to evaluate each stage in conjunction
108. Emmenegger & Tschentscher, supra note 106, at 557; Anthony D'Amato,
Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?, 84
AM. J. INTL L. 190, 195 (1990). Simply put, anthropocentrism is the primacy of
human interest over any others. Any rights that any other living thing may enjoy
are derived from the benefit that humans receive from that thing.
109. Emmenegger & Tschentscher, supra note 106, at 557-59. An example of
anthropocentrism would be the early stages of IWC regulation. Calves and nursing
mothers were protected to help assure a sizable catch limit for the following sea-
son, not because the whales themselves had intrinsic value which gave rise to
rights.
110. Id. at 572-73, 579.
111. Id. at 577.
112. Id. at 587; see also Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Stand-
ing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
113. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 23.
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with the anthropocentrism to biocentrism progression dis-
cussed above."4
Before World War I whaling was in the "Free Resource
Stage.""5 In this stage, the killing of whales was uncon-
strained. The prevailing view was virtually undisputed: whales
were simply there for the taking."6 Anthropocentrism gov-
erned our thoughts of nature at this time."7
Between 1918 and 1931 the industry entered a "Regula-
tion Stage" in which there was some attempt to control the
practice through loose restrictions and a licensing system."8
Since the concern at this stage was only for the health of the
industry, it is difficult to distinguish this stage from the previ-
ous one.
From 1931 to 1945 many states observed that the deple-
tion of whale stocks would cripple a valuable industry, thus
commencing a "Conservation Stage.""' The biological truism
that a successful parasite never kills its host comes to mind in
this stage. The measures the whalers adopted only reflected a
desire to avoid the industrial crisis that would result if whale
stocks were depleted, and the catastrophe if important species
became extinct.
The next stage, "Conservation becomes Protection," from
1945-1977, saw the rise of the "Save the Whales" environmen-
tal movement. 20 This stage saw the growth of the idea that
whales deserve protection as an important part of nature and
114. See generally Emmenegger & Tschentscher, supra note 106, at 546-91. The
analysis of Emmenegger and Tschentscher is a macro, almost philosophical, review
of the evolution of environmental attitudes. Although they do refer tangentially to
the whaling issue at several points, and in fact refer to the DAmato and Chopra
article, id. at 554 nn.29 & 30, they are not particularly concerned with any one
individual order or species. The analysis of D'Amato and Chopra, however, seems
to support their thesis. Whales may be the best example of the philosophical de-
velopment of "anthropocentrism to biocentrism."
115. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 28-29.
116. Id. It was noted in the last section that commercial whaling rose as an
industry in this stage. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
117. Emmenegger & Tschentscher, supra note 106, at 550.
118. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 30.
119. Id. at 30-32. Although actual measures of conservation were introduced,
the concern was still for the long-term health of the industry. Id. at 30.
120. Id. at 32. Protection is different from conservation in that its goal is to
provide for the survival and longevity of whales as a part of nature and not for
the purpose of supporting an industry. Id. at 32-40. Emmenegger and Tschentscher
probably would conclude that anthropocentrism became biocentrism for whales
during this stage. See Emmenegger & Tschentscher, supra note 106, at 550.
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not merely as a consumer product, as well as the first aware-
ness of ecological concerns in IWC decisionmaking."2
From 1977 to 1982 was the "Protection Stage."' During
this period UNCLOS became finalized and allowed for states to
declare up to 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ).' Thus, many nations were able to pass protective
legislation covering huge segments of the ocean.'
The next stage, the "Preservation Stage," ran from 1982 to
1990.' Preservation is a movement to ban whaling because
it is morally wrong. 6 The argument of the anti-whaling forc-
es had evolved from "killing whales is bad for the global envi-
ronment" to "it is immoral to kill such magnificent crea-
tures."' As more non-whaling states joined the IWC, they
passed the moratorium in 1 9 8 2 ."a Some states even seemed
121. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 38. It is helpful to remember from
the last section that several new, non-whaling states joined the IWC during this
stage.
122. Id. at 40.
123. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 55-75, 21 I.L.M. at 1280-86. Article 57 pro-
vides that "[tihe exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond ... the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id. art. 57,
28 I.L.M. at 1280.
124. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 40; see also UNCLOS, supra note 4,
arts. 56, 65, 73, 21 I.L.M. at 1280, 1282, 1284. Article 56 grants the coastal state
jurisdiction with regard to "the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment." Id. art. 56(1)(b)(iii), 21 I.L.M. at 1280. Article 65 recognizes:
[Tihe right of a coastal State or the competence of an international orga-
nization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of
marine mammals more strictly than provided for in [articles 55-75].
States shall co-operate with a view to the conservation of marine mam-
mals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the
appropriate international organizations for their conservation, manage-
ment and study.
Id. art. 65, 21 I.L.M. at 1284. Article 73 provides that:
The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest
and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with
the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Conven-
tion.
Id. art. 73(1).
125. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 45.
126. Id. at 45-48. Preservationists are the stalwarts of the "Save the Whales"
movement and differ from conservationists and protectionists in that they are not
likely to make trade-offs and insist on nothing less than a permanent ban on
whaling. Id at 45.
127. See id. at 140-48.
128. THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 20.
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to take a perverse pride in renouncing their prior sins.'29
The sixth and final stage represents the current status of
whaling. It can be titled the "Emerging Entitlement Stage."3 '
Because of the 1982 moratorium, virtually all commercial
whaling had ceased by the beginning of this stage. The morato-
rium remains in effect today.13 ' At the 1994 meeting of the
IWC, only two nations, Japan and Norway, were reported to be
actively engaged in commercial whaling operations.32 In ad-
dition to the moratorium, the IWC established a sanctuary in
the waters south of forty degrees south latitude. 33 (See Ap-
pendix for a map of the sanctuary.) The IWC also passed a
resolution which declared that member states cannot export
any of the meat derived from scientific whaling.
3 4
D'Amato and Chopra suggest a conclusion that may be
drawn from the review of their five stages and their implica-
tions about a sixth: the preservation of whales is emerging as a
key principle of customary international law.'35 They assert
that attitudes and policies of the vast majority of governments
now reflect a belief that whale preservation is necessary. 31
That is, there is a growing sense of legal obligation toward
whales because it is the "right, proper and natural" policy to
adopt.3 7 Indeed most nations today strenuously oppose com-
129. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 47-48; see also DAY, supra note 1, at
19. In 1978 Australia declared whaling morally wrong. Day credits them with
being the first state to do so. Id. The tiny nation of Seychelles followed in 1979.
Id. at 96. D'Amato and Chopra point to similar statements from Brazil, India, and
Oman in this stage. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 47-48.
130. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 48-54.
131. FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 45.
132. Id. at 1. Norway is currently harvesting ininke whales under its reserva-
tion to the Convention and the scientific whaling exception. Id. Japan's operations
are under the scientific whaling exception. See id. Iceland withdrew from the IWC
in 1992. Jay Johnson, Iceland Notifies Intent to Withdraw from the International
Whaling Commission, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L. 212, 212 (1991). Although Iceland
withdrew from the IWC in protest over the moratorium, government officials have
stated that if the country resumes commercial whaling, it will rejoin the IWC.
More Whale Hunts, NEW SCIENTIST, June 25, 1994, at 11.
133. FORTY-FIFtH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 28. The vote for the
sanctuary was 23 in favor, 1 against (Japan), and 6 abstentions. Id. See Appendix
infra p. 360 for a map of the sanctuary.
134. Id. at 44-45. Previously, 49% of whale meat could be exported. NMFS
Report, supra note 38, para. 7.
135. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 49-51. For a review of the require-
ments of customary international law, see sources cited supra note 105.
136. Id. at 48-50.
137. Id. at 50.
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mercial whaling. Anyone who reads the annual reports of the
IWC since the moratorium decision can see that the organiza-
tion, which started as a "whalers' club," is now firmly on the
side of the whales. Surely one can discern the clear trend to-
ward whale preservation, but does this solid trend rise to the
level of opinio juris that is necessary to establish customary
international law?
Several factors exist that would tend to undercut the argu-
ment that whale preservation has emerged as an international
custom which binds all states to follow. First, the IWC morato-
rium is subject to annual review. 3 1 One of the purported rea-
sons for the moratorium in 1982 was the poor scientific data
available on whale stocks. 3 ' Thus, should the available data
on whale stocks be grounded on better scientific evidence, and
indicate that the population of certain species of whales has
sufficiently recovered, the states concerned could consider a
motion to repeal the moratorium. 40 As whale census num-
bers improve, so do the arguments of whaling nations that it is
now safe to resume limited whaling.' Not only is Norway
currently harvesting minke whales, but since 1993 it has an-
nually requested the IWC to reconsider the moratorium based
upon the scientific evidence of plentiful minke populations.
Another factor that would tend to indicate a lack of opinio
juris is the United States' long-time support of aboriginal
whaling." At the 1994 meeting, the United States asked for
and received a large increase in its quota of bowhead whales
for the Alaskan Inuit tribe,'" which strongly indicates that
138. See THIRTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 21.
139. Id. at 20; see also President's Message to the International Whaling Com-
mission, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 634 (July 17, 1981).
140. More Whales, More Questions, SEA FRONTIERS, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 12. New
whale counting methods such as line-transect surveys, photo identification, and
acoustics have indicated that the number of most whale species have increased. In
addition to modern, hi-tech methods of ascertaining whale populations, scientists
also look to old ships' logs and historical records to find descriptions of whale
numbers at specific navigation points. "For example, such records suggest that 100
years ago about 5,000 beluga whales lived in the St. Lawrence River and estuary;
today there are only about 500." Id.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., FORTY-FIFIH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 48; see also
David Swinbanks, Whaling Meeting Expected to Leave Issue Unresolved, NATURE,
May 6, 1993, at 9. The scientific committee of the IWC has determined that
minke whales now exist in sufficient numbers. Id.
143. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994).
144. FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 21-22; see id. at 52.
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U.S. support for aboriginal whaling will not end anytime soon.
In addition to undermining a claim of opinio juris, U.S. sup-
port for aboriginal whaling arguably creates a contradiction
with its role as a key whale advocate on the IWC.' 4 It allows
the Japanese and Norwegians to exploit arguments that coast-
al villages in their countries have the same degree of "cultural
dependence" on the minke whale as Inuits do on the bow-
head.46
An additional factor that indicates a lack of opinio juris is
the unfortunate fact of pirate whaling.47 Pirate whaling can
involve governments that outwardly oppose whaling so as not
to incur the wrath of protective measures but then tacitly sup-
port illicit whaling operations by their nationals. 4 s If govern-
ments have knowledge of illegal whaling activity by their na-
tionals and do not investigate or prosecute the conduct, it is
hard to contend that these governments are acting in a man-
ner consistent with the thesis that whale, preservation has
Aboriginal and scientific whaling were specifically excluded from the 1982 morato-
rium. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
145. See Stephen M. Hankins, Comment, The United States' Abuse of the Ab-
original Whaling Exception: A Contradiction in United States Policy and a Danger.
ous Precedent for the Whale, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 489, 522 (1990). Hankins
argues that if the United States intends to continue its support of aboriginal whal-
ing for the Inuits it should at least be prepared to supply competent scientific
evidence that the bowhead whale stocks can support the hunt. See id. at 495. In
fact, the bowhead remains a protected species. Id. at 520.
146. Id. at 494. At the 1994 IWC meeting Japan requested, but was denied, an
interim quota of 50 minke whales for its "community-based" whalers. FORTY-FIFTH
REPORT OF THE 1WC, supra note 4, at 18. D'Amato and Chopra dismiss aboriginal
whaling as a counterclaim to their thesis that whales have an entitlement to life.
D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 57-61. They argue that Inuits should be
compensated for the near extinction of the bowhead at the hands of commercial
whalers, and be given a reasonable alternative as a means of subsistence. Id. at
60. The statements of the United States government and its record on the IWC,
however, indicate that support for aboriginal whaling is a mainstay of United
States policy on whaling. Message to the Congress on Whaling Activities of Nor-
way, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 1684 (Oct. 4, 1993); see 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994).
147. See DAY, supra note 1, at 78-85.
148. See id. at 80-81. Day points to Japanese-controlled, illicit whaling oper-
ations in Chile, Peru, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the 1970s and
early 1980s. The underground industry was driven by the lucrative black market
in Japan for whale meat. Id. at 80. Although current information on pirate whal-
ing is sparse, a recent news story revealed that the meat of some protected spe-
cies has been discovered in Japanese markets. DNA Tests for Suspect Whale
Trade, supra note 38, at 11. A similar report indicated that a Norwegian export
company was caught smuggling whale meat to South Korea. Norwegians Found
Smuggling Whale Meat, EARTH ISLAND J., Winter 1993, at 6.
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become customary international law. Such conduct is also
relevant to the first element of international custom; that is, a
general practice of promoting the preservation of whales may
be lacking where those states have knowledge of illegal whal-
ing operations but fail to act to prevent them.
D. The Problem of Persistent Objectors
The strongest reason to conclude that whale preservation
is not yet customary international law is perhaps the most
obvious. Although small in number, there are strong dissenters
to such a claim. There is no requirement in international law
that every state must show the general practice or evidence
the opinio juris. Certainly, however, a large majority of states
should do so.' Most states do in fact oppose whaling, have
made public pronouncements to that effect, and act in accor-
dance with that belief. However, the small minority of states
that do not are not quiet about it. Japan, Norway, and Iceland
have been most vocal and visible on the IWC and in the world
arena in attempting to preserve, not the rights of whales, but
the rights of whalers.150 Moreover, these states are important
in the debate as their positions go a long way to defeat the
claim of custom at the threshold. Thus, the arduous dissent of
these few states, by itself, could arguably prevent the forma-
tion of customary law in the first instance.
Even if the large number of anti-whaling states were seen
as sufficient to create the right of whales to live in peace under
customary international law, another rule of law exists that
renders the question practically moot: the problem of persis-
tent objectors.15' Even if commercial whaling was adjudicated
to be illegal under international custom, it is well settled that
persistent objectors to that custom are not bound by it. 5'
149. IAN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (4th ed.
1990). To establish customary international law, "[clomplete uniformity is not re-
quired, but substantial uniformity is . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
150. MacKenzie, supra note 38, at 22.
151. BROWNLIE, supra note 149, at 10. "[A] State may contract out of a custom
in the process of formation. Evidence of objection must be clear and there is prob-
ably a presumption of acceptance which is to be rebutted. Whatever the theoretical
underpinnings of the principle, it is well recognized by international tribunals, and
in the practice of states." Id. (footnotes omitted).
152. See id.; see also Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131-38 (Dec. 18)
(United Kingdom held to have acquiesced to Norway's system of straight baselines
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Specifically, Japan, Norway, and Iceland would be deemed
persistent objectors, not obligated to obey the customary pro-
tection of whales. The likely scenario for the assertion of a
violation of customary international law in this case would be
that an anti-whaling state, at the behest of environmental
groups, would seek adjudication and enforcement against Ja-
pan or Norway. These respondent states need only raise their
well-documented status as persistent objectors to rebut the
presumption of acceptance of the purported custom. 153
There is no question that today the dominant policy of the
IWC and most of its member states is that of whale preserva-
tion. Whales are seen as deserving protection because they are
intelligent, sentient beings that communicate and live in social
units. Except for some very notable exceptions, the practice of
commercial whaling has ceased to exist. The 1982 IWC morato-
rium remains in effect. Both international and domestic legal
instruments provide substantial protection to whales and other
marine mammals.
D'Amato and Chopra present a compelling case regarding
the progression of the rights of whales and the evolution in
their status over time."6 But strong countervailing argu-
ments exist that force the neutral observer to conclude that the
preservation of whales as an integral part of nature has not
yet passed into the body of customary international law. Spe-
cifically, the opinio juris that the preservation of whales is
obligatory has not yet been obtained. Of course, there is no
requirement that opiniojuris rise to a level of moral obligation,
as opposed to merely a legal one. However, such a finding of
morality might be necessary, practically speaking, to establish
enforceable rights for a non-human species. Even if such status
were attained, the practical consequences for whale protection
Vhere it did not file a formal protest). The acquiescence of the United Kingdom in
the Fisheries case can be contrasted with the consistent voting record and strenu-
ous protests of Japan and Norway to the preservation of whales.
153. BROWNLIE, supra note 149, at 10. The use of the persistent objector rule
to escape obligations of customary international law may increase in the future
because of the importance of multilateral conventions in the formation of interna-
tional custom. See David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector
Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 957, 957 (1989). David Colson suggests that multilateral
conventions provide an easy opportunity for a state to register its objection. Id. at
958. Colson notes, however, that the more isolated a state becomes on a particular
issue, the more vigorous it must be in affirming its objector status. Id. at 969.
154. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 1, at 28-50.
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at the policy level are negligible. This is particularly true given
the persistent objector rule and the likelihood that key objec-
tors will begin whaling operations as soon as it makes commer-
cial sense to do so. The states against whom the custom most
needs to be enforced would be exempt.
In sum, the changing status of whales over time signifies
an evolution toward a policy of preservation. However, provi-
sions of some recent treaties may hinder that policy.
IV. THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF RECENT TREATIES ON WHALE
PRESERVATION
During the Cold War, global bipolarity dominated interna-
tional affairs, and national security was the primary objec-
tive. 5 But since the fall of the Soviet Union, any perceptive
student of foreign affairs has observed that the promotion of
international trade, specifically the elimination of trade barri-
ers, has become a much higher priority on the world agenda.
The recent ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreements of
the GATT (Uruguay Round) 56 and NAFTA 57 are both in-
tended to reduce global trade barriers and further the concept
of free trade.
Some scholars have suggested that there is an inherent
conflict between the goals of free trade and environmental
protection.' States which have minimal environmental pro-
155. See Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, INTL
SEcURITy, Fall 1993, at 44, 44-45.
156. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Final Act]. The GATT
was first signed in 1947 and endorsed the concept of free trade in the original
text. GATT, supra note 5, 61 Stat. at A3, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188. The term "Round"
refers to multi-year negotiating sessions convened for the purpose of removing
trade barriers and furthering the goals of the original 1947 instrument. The "Uru-
guay Round" simply refers to the most recent session, begun in Punta del Este,
Uruguay in September 1986. These negotiations were concluded on April 15, 1994.
The Uruguay Round Final Act was signed by 111 countries, including the United
States, in Marrakesh, Morocco. It modified the provisions of GATT and established
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to resolve disputes. The United States imple-
mented the Uruguay Round with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3624 (1994).
157. NAFTA, supra note 6, 32 I.L.M. at 296. NAFTA is a regional trade agree-
ment reducing trade barriers among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
158. Kelly J. Hunt, Comment, International Environmental Agreements in Con-
flict with GATT-Greening GATT After the Uruguay Round Agreement, 30 INTL
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tection laws will have a natural competitive advantage. As a
result, most states, particularly developing states, will have an
incentive to water down their laws to attract foreign invest-
ment. The multinational corporate investors will seek out the
least restrictive, and least expensive, regulatory climate in
which to produce goods for the world market.
Equally important, the use of unilateral trade sanctions to
compel environmental objectives probably violates free trade
obligations. This conflict may be unavoidable in the area of
whale preservation. Because the United States uses its domes-
tic legislation to compel compliance with the regulations of the
IWC with the threat of trade sanctions, 5 9 and it represents
the world's largest market, it is at the forefront of this contro-
versy.
In addition to the GATT and NAFTA, UNCLOS may con-
tain provisions that render the unilateral imposition of trade
sanctions on offending states a violation of the Convention's
dispute settlement procedure.60 Although UNCLOS is not a
trade treaty, its comprehensive treatment of all aspects of the
law of the sea may preclude a state from exercising unilateral
trade sanctions, not provided for in the Convention, to compel
compliance with an environmental objective. 6'
Several provisions in these three agreements may adverse-
ly impact the ability of the United States, or other like-minded
members of the IWC, to use trade sanctions as a weapon to
compel compliance with a policy of protecting whales.
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The question of whether or not provisions of the GATT will
interfere with whale preservation in the next century is uncer-
tain."'62 However, a comprehensive treaty such as GATT that
LAW. 163, 163 (1996); David J. Ross, Note, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and
the Environment, 2 DUKE J. COmP. & INt' L. 345, 345 (1992). Conflict between
environmental protection and free trade is likely in the future. But see David
Palmeter, Environment and Trade: Much Ado About Little?, J. WORLD TRADE, June
1993, at 55, 55-56 (positing that the conflict between the environment and free
trade is minimal).
159. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994); 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994).
160. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 286-287, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-23.
161. See Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States'
Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other Inter-
national Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLoGY L.Q. 1, 5 (1994).
162. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT An
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lowers trade barriers signals a move toward multilateralism
that implies a disdain for unilateral measures to further envi-
ronmental goals."6 Several commentators have observed that
the use of domestic environmental laws to impose trade barri-
ers smacks of protectionism and hampers the effectiveness of
trade treaties.' The 1947 GATT provides in article III, "Na-
tional Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation," that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party import-
ed into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use.1"
Another relevant provision is article XI, "General Elimina-
tion of Quantitative Restrictions," which provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of
any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined
for the territory of any other contracting party."
The Uruguay Round includes a provision which addresses
the "Rules of Origin" of goods:
[Riules of origin shall not themselves create restrictive, dis-
torting, or disruptive effects on international trade. They
shall not pose unduly strict requirements or require the
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 751, 775-90 (1994). The vagueness of the GATr provisions, and
the lack of authoritative rulings, make it impossible to provide a definitive answer
to the question of the consistency of GATT with the Pelly Amendment. Id. at 775.
163. See id. at 805. See generally Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of
U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins
and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT', L. & ECON. 477 (1991).
164. Steve Charnovitz, The Regulation of Environmental Standards By Interna-
tional Trade Agreements, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 631, 631-33 (Aug. 25, 1993).
165. GATT, supra note 5, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206.
166. Id. art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-26. Paragraph 2 of
article XI specifically enumerates three exceptions to the general rule in % 1, but
these do not include any mention of trade measures to protect the environment.
Id. art. XI(2)(a)-(c), 61 Stat. at A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226.
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fulfilment of a certain condition not related to manufacturing
or processing, as a prerequisite for the determination of the
country of origin."6
The United States has enacted legislation implementing
the Uruguay Round. 1" When the United States passed the
implementing law it included a provision which specifically re-
served the right to maintain its existing environmental protec-
tive legislation.'69 It provides that "[n]o provision of any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any
such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsis-
tent with any law of the United States shall have effect."70 It
goes on to provide "[niothing in this Act shall be construed...
to amend or modify any law of the United States, including
any law relating to... the protection of human, animal, or





One can certainly foresee how a state in the future might
incur sanctions under the Pelly Amendment and claim that the
embargo of its fish products violates the "Rules of Origin,"
"National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation," or
the "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions" provi-
sions.
In fact, in 1991 Mexico made such a claim against the
United States arising under articles III and XI of the GATT.
1. The Tuna-Dolphin Decision..
In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, the United States used the
Marine Mammal Protection Act to exclude Mexican tuna from
the U.S. market when it was discovered that Mexican tuna
fishermen were incidentally killing large numbers of dolphins
167. Uruguay Round Final Act, supra note 156, art. 2(c), available in Westlaw,
GATT database, 1994 WL 761483, at *424-25.
168. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624 (1994).
169. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(A)(ii).
170. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1).
171. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(A)(i).
172. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(A)(ii).
173. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel,
GATT Doc. DS 21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in GATT, BASIc INSTRUMENTS &
SELECTED DOCUMENTs 155 (37th Supp. 1989-90) [hereinafter Panel Decision]. An-
other Mexican claim under article XII was not reached. Id. para. 5.19.
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with purse-seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific. 74 Mexi-
co claimed that the U.S. action was really a protectionist mea-
sure on behalf of the U.S. tuna industry and not marine mam-
mals.75 The United States contended that the use of the Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act to exclude the tuna was a lawful
application of a "product or process" standard permitted under
article Il of the GATT.'76 The United States also responded
that the purpose of the action under the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act was the protection of marine mammals and not
tuna fishermen.'77 It further argued that all tuna fishermen
who sought to sell their tuna in the United States, including
domestic fishermen, were subject to substantially the same
product and process standards in a non-discriminatory man-
ner.
178
Last, the United States contended that even if its action
violated articles Ill and XI, the enforcement of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act was authorized by article XX of the
GATT, titled "General Exceptions," which provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect hu-
man, animal or plant life or health;'79 [or] ... (g) relating to
174. Id. paras. 2.7-.8; see Ross, supra note 158, at 345. Since the Tuna-Dolphin
Decision, the problem of incidental death of cetaceans by purse-seine nets has
abated substantially but not disappeared. FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra
note 4, at 34; INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, FORTY-FOURTH REPORT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION 25 (1994) [hereinafter FORTY-FOURTH
REPORT OF THE IW]. In 1993 the incidental mortality of cetaceans and dolphins
by purse-seine nets was reported to be reduced by 43% since 1991. See M.A Hall
& C. Lennert, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Incidental Mortality of
Dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishery in 1992, in FORTY-FOURTH
REPORT OF THE IWC, supra, at 349, 349.
175. Panel Decision, supra note 173, para. 3.58.
176. See id. paras. 3.17-.18. The term "product and process" standards generally
refers to the right of the importing state to set a minimum standard of quality for
imports. It is easier to understand its application to a manufacturing or agricul-
tural process rather than a method of fishing.
177. Id. para. 3.17. 4
178. Id. para. 3.19.
179. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(I)(b), 61 Stat. at A61-62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption."8
Although the GATT Council did not adopt the finding,
181
the GATT panel hearing Mexico's claim held that the United
States' application of the Marine Mammal Protection Act in
fact violated articles II1182 and XI 8 of GATT. It further
held that the U.S. action was not "necessary" under article
XX(b)184 and that neither XX(b) nor XX(g) could be applied
extrajurisdictionally.' The Panel noted that to permit the
application of such standards extrajurisdictionally would allow
the unilateral imposition of the conservation policies of one
treaty member upon all others."8 '
The Panel actually addressed the issue of whether or not
the Pelly Amendment is inconsistent with the GATT.'87 It
noted that since the statute gave U.S. authorities discretion to
refrain from taking any trade measure at all, it could not by
itself be considered in conflict with the GATT.'88 Environ-
mental groups had frowned upon the decision in Japan Whal-
ing Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,'89 that found Pelly to
be discretionary in the first place. This finding by the GATT
panel may realize their worst fears about the continuing rocky
relationship between marine mammal protection and free
trade.
While the GATT panel's Tuna-Dolphin decision is the only
180. Id. art. XX(I)(g), 61 Stat. at A62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. For a full discussion
of the parties' positions with respect to the role of article XX(I)(b) and (g), see
Panel Decision, supra note 173, paras. 3.27-.56.
181. Mexico decided not to present the finding of the Panel to the GATT Coun-
cil because of concern for its possible detrimental impact on the NAFTA negotia-
tions. Ross, supra note 158, at 353-54.
182. Panel Decision, supra note 173, paras. 5.14-.16. Paragraph 5.15 of the
decision held that a state may not discriminate against another state's product
based upon its method of production. Thus, the United States action violated arti-
cle III of the GATT. Id. para. 5.15.
183. Id. paras. 5.17-.18.
184. Id. para. 5.28; see id. para. 5.24.
185. Id. para. 5.32.
186. Id.
187. Id. para. 5.20.
188. Id.
189. 478 U.S. 221 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
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real evidence to date of a legal tension between free trade and
the goal of cetacean protection, it does not augur well for fu-
ture conflicts of this kind. The ultimate goal of GATT is re-
duced trade barriers worldwide.' 9 If the Pelly Amendment
were to be applied to embargo the fish products of states that
use cetacean-hazardous fishing methods, a future GATT panel
would probably decide such action to be illegal.
The most likely application of Pelly is in fact more remote
than in the Tuna-Dolphin decision; it would most likely be
applied against a state that resumes commercial whaling. In
such case, the sanctions of Pelly would be even more attenuat-
ed from the environmentally destructive conduct that it sought
to punish, even more so than the embargo of tuna whose har-
vesting was actually responsible for the death of dolphins.
There would be no recourse to arguments of product-or-process
standards. In such a case, a future GATT panel might be even
less inclined to hold in favor of Pelly sanctions.
2. The United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development
Any future interpretation of the GATT that involves a
conflict between free trade and the environment will be influ-
enced by the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, the "Rio Conference,"' 9' which considered is-
sues relating to trade and the environment with a discussion of
GATT provisions and principles. 9 ' The Rio Conference en-
190. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at
224-25.
191. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DE-
vELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.8 (1992) [herein-
after UNCED REPORT]. The Conference was held in Rio de Janeiro from June 3 to
June 14, 1992. Id. at 2. It adopted three non-legally binding agreements: the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, which is a statement of 27 prin-
ciples; Agenda 21, which is an 800-page document setting out the objectives and
activities on 40 subject areas; and a statement of forest principles. Id. The Confer-
ence opened for signature two binding treaties: the Biodiversity Convention, supra
note 107, 31 I.L.M. at 818, and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. The Conference is most frequently cited for Agenda 21, which
calls for "[ijnternational cooperation to accelerate sustainable development in devel-
oping countries, and related domestic policies." UNCED REPORT, supra, at 14. All
documents related to the Conference can be located on the Internet at <<go-
pherJ/gopher.undp.org70/00/unconfs/UNCED/Englisb/a2l_02>>.
192. UNCED REPORT, supra note 191, at 18, 20-22.
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dorsed the concept of "sustainable development" (economic
development that the environment can safely support) and
expressed confidence that it would be promoted through more
liberal trade.193 It cautioned, however, that unilateral trade
restrictions to promote environmental goals should be avoid-
ed."94 It produced the following declaration:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open
international economic system that would lead to economic
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to bet-
ter address the problem of environmental degradation. Trade
policy measures for environmental purposes should not con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral
actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Envi-
ronmental measures addressing transboundary or global
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based
on an international consensus."
While the concept of sustainable development need not be
antithetical to whale protection, the primacy of unrestricted
trade over unilateral environmental protective measures large-
ly eviscerates the key purpose of Pelly. The idea of internation-
al consensus for a problem like cetacean protection is a good
one to the extent it can be reached. Such a desire for consensus
strengthens the hand of the IWC as a multilateral organiza-
tion. However, it weakens those states that choose to enforce
its provisions extrajurisdictionally through their domestic laws.
3. The Uruguay Round
The principal achievement of the Uruguay Round of GATT
is the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO).5 6 The WTO expands the existing dispute settlement
mechanism of the GATT treaty and has exclusive authority to
interpret the agreement by a three-fourths vote.' Although
193. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in UNCED REPORT,
supra note 191, princes. 1, 4, 16.
194. Id. princ. 12.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Uruguay Round Final Act, supra note 156, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
197. Id. art. 9(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1148. Each member of the GATT is represented
on the WTO. Id. art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1145-46.
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the scope and power of the WTO to limit domestic attempts at
unilateral enforcement of environmental agreements through
trade measures is yet to be determined, it is logical to conclude
that the WTO will follow the key principles espoused in the
Tuna-Dolphin Decision and the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development.
On the other hand, the Uruguay Round also included a
Decision on Trade and Environment, which recognized the
need to coordinate the often competing policies underlying free
trade and protecting the environment.'98 It stated the inten-
tion to establish a Committee on Trade and Environment as a
subset of the WTO. 99 This may indicate a greater apprecia-
tion for environmental issues and the need to take them into
account when developing trade policies.
B. The North American Free Trade Agreement
On January 1, 1994 NAFTA entered into force between the
governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States." It
contains free trade provisions very similar to the GATT but
appears to be somewhat more environmentally conscious."0'
Although the protection of whales is not mentioned in NAFTA,
article 104(1)(a) states that in any conflict between NAFTA
and CITES,2 2 CITES "shall prevail to the extent of the in-
consistency, provided that where a Party has a clear choice
among equally effective and reasonably available means of
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alterna-
tive that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of
198. Decision on Trade and Environment, in LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 53, 53-55 (1996).
199. Id.
200. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 2203, 32 I.L.M. at 702; see Tim Golden, Tariffs
Drop as Trade Agreement Kicks in with New Year's Arrival, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1994, at 1.
201. For example, article 1114 of NAFTA states, "Nothing in this Chapter shall
be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any mea-
sure otherwise consistent with this chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns." NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 1114, 32 I.L.M. at 642 (em-
phasis added). For a complete and current discussion of the impact of the GATT
and NAFTA on the environment, see Jennifer Schultz, The GATTIWTO Committee
on Trade and the Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. J. INTL L.
423 (1995).
202. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. at 243.
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this Agreement."2"3 Although less pervasive than the WTO,
NAFTA also creates its own dispute settlement mechanism to
interpret the Agreement.2 4
Before the treaty entered into force, the parties negotiated
a side-agreement on the environment which obligates the par-
ties to effectively enforce their own environmental laws.0 5 It
also established a Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion.20 ' The obligation to enforce their own environmental
laws is subject to article 37 which provides that "[niothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to empower a Party's au-
thorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activi-
ties on the territory of another Party."2 7 President Clinton
described the environmental regime established by the side-
agreement as "ground-breaking" in that it provides for trade
sanctions against any country that fails to enforce its own
environmental laws.08
The United States implementing legislation of NAFTA
contains provisions identical to those in the implementing
legislation of the Uruguay Round,0 9 which declares the su-
premacy of any other law of the United States over any incon-
sistent provision of the Agreement.210 It goes on to provide
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed... to amend or
modify any law of the United States, including any law regard-
ing.., the protection of human, animal, or plant life or
health,21 [or] the protection of the environment .... 2 2
203. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 104(l)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 297-98.
204. Id. arts. 2001-2022, 32 I.L.M. at 693-94.
205. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 5, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1483-84; see President's Remarks at the
Signing Ceremony for the Supplemental Agreements to the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 1485, 1488 (Sept. 14, 1993).
206. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 205,
art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
207. Id. art. 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1493.
208. President's Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Supplemental Agree-
ments to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 1485,
1488 (Sept. 14, 1993).
209. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (1994) ("No provi-
sion of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstances, that is inconsistent with any law of the
United States shall have effect.").
210. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3312(a)(1) (1994).
211. 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (a)(2)(A)(i).
212. 19 U.S.C. § 3312 (a)(2)(A)(ii).
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Because NAFTA only affects the United States, Canada,
and Mexico, it will probably never be directly involved in the
whale preservation debate. However, should a problem arise
similar to that of the Tuna-Dolphin controversy, Mexico would
have the cumulative strength of the legal regime of NAFTA as
well as the GATT on its side. The fact that the United States
enacted identical provisions in both the Uruguay Round of
GATT213 and NAFTA, 214 reserving the right to protect the
environment, strongly indicates that the United States is not
about to give up the option of unilateral enforcement anytime
soon. Despite the disdain for unilateral environmental trade
sanctions under both the GATT and NAFTA, Pelly appears to
be alive and well in U.S. law and policy.
The consideration of NAFTA is important to the whaling
debate for three reasons. First, it signals the importance of free
trade objectives in the post-Cold War world. Second, it exem-
plifies the trend toward multilateralism to resolve disputes
that affect international trade. Third, its environmental side-
agreement demonstrates that environmental concerns can be
addressed and integrated into a trade treaty where the parties
are willing to do so.
The evaluation of the GATT and NAFTA highlights a
potential obstacle to whale protection. The retention of U.S.
power, under domestic law, to protect the environment may
edify anti-whaling advocates, but the potential conflict will
remain so long as trade sanctions under Pelly remain the pri-
mary enforcement mechanism of IWC regulations. Further-
more, the United States' willingness to impose sanctions will
probably continue to decline as the global policy of free trade
increases, especially if it consistently loses before various tri-
bunals.
Whether or not a treaty-based "free trade" defense to an
action under Pelly will be raised in the future remains to be
seen. However, if the United States wishes to continue its role
as whale protector, it may need to develop enforcement strate-
gies that do not run afoul of such solid treaty obligations as
those established in the GATT and NAFTA. In any case, the
trend toward multilateral dispute resolution of trade issues
213. 19 U.S.C. § 3512.
214. 19 U.S.C. § 3312.
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dilutes the United States' ability to unilaterally influence the
outcome of any future controversy.
C. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea 1
5
On November 16, 1994, UNCLOS entered into force.216
Until recently, the United States objected to the deep sea-bed
regime in Part XI of the convention.217 On July 28, 1994, the
United States voted at the United Nations General Assembly
in favor of a resolution endorsing a new agreement that sub-
stantially amended ("fixed") the deep sea-bed regime.218
One of the major accomplishments of UNCLOS is its com-
prehensive dispute settlement provisions. 29 Where the State
Parties are unable to resolve a dispute on their own, the con-
vention provides for Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding
Decisions °.22 A state may bring a claim against another State
Party in any of the following fora: (a) the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea (constituted in accordance with
Annex VI); (b) the International Court of Justice; (c) an arbi-
tral tribunal (constituted in accordance with Annex VII); or (d)
a special arbitral tribunal (constituted in accordance with An-
nex VIII)." 1 Any of these tribunals has jurisdiction over a
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
215. UNCLOS, supra note 4, 21 I.L.M. at 1261.
216. Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 35,
at 7, U.N. Doc. A/49/631 (1994); Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment
and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 INTit LAW.
879, 879 (1994). The Convention entered into force one year after the 60th state
deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretary General.
See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 308(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1327.
217. President's Statement on the United States Actions Concerning the Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 1982 PUB. PAPERS 911, 911-12 (July 9, 1982). Presi-
dent Reagan stated that most of the provisions of the Convention represented
significant accomplishments, but the deep sea-bed regime did not serve America's
interest regarding mineral exploration. Id. at 911.
218. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part X of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., 101st plen. mtg., Agenda Item 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263
(1994); see Charney, supra note 216, at 880-81 (1994).
219. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 279-299, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-26. Article 279
requires States Parties to resolve their disputes by peaceful means. Id. art. 279,
21 I.L.M. at 1322. Article 280 allows parties to choose their own means of peace-
ful dispute settlement. Id. art. 280.
220. Id. arts. 286-296, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-24.
221. Id. art. 287, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-23.
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UNCLOS."2 They also have "jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of an international
agreement related to the purposes of this Convention, which is
submitted to it in accordance with the agreement."' Any de-
cision which a competent tribunal renders is final and binding
on the Parties.2"
The comprehensive nature of UNCLOS almost guarantees
that state actions which diminish the effectiveness of an IWC
regulation will come under its purview.2" Several substan-
tive provisions of UNCLOS are particularly relevant. A con-
cerned state may invoke these if an issue of whale preserva-
tion arises in the future. Specifically, article 65 (Marine mam-
mals) mentions cetaceans as deserving of special protection in
the EEZ:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or
the competence of an international organization, as appro-
priate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of ma-
rine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part.
States shall co-operate with a view to the conservation of
marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in par-
ticular work through the appropriate international organiza-
tions for their conservation, management and study. 6
Article 120 extends this protection to the high seas.2 In
addition, article 64 (Highly migratory species) requires the
coastal state and other states whose nationals fish in the re-
gion (EEZ) for the highly migratory species listed in Annex
12' to cooperate directly or through the appropriate interna-
222. Id. art. 288(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
223. Id. art. 288(2) (emphasis added).
224. Id. art. 296, 21 I.L.M. at 1324.
225. Id. art. 288(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1323. Article 288(2) even appears to allow the
chosen tribunal to interpret the Whaling Convention if submitted in accordance
with a claim under UNCLOS. Id. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 161.
226. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 65, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
227. Id. art. 120, 21 I.L.M. at 1291 ("Article 65 also applies to the conservation
and management of marine mammals in the high seas.").
228. Id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282; id. Annex I, 21 I.L.M. at 1329. Annex I
enumerates seven families of cetaceans: Physeteridae, Balaenopterkae, Balaenidae,
Eschrichtiidae, Monodontidae, Ziphiidae, and Delphinidae. The problem of highly
migratory species is analogous to the central problem of whale protection. It exem-
plifies the conflict between the conservation goals of a coastal state and freedom of
fishing on the high seas. It is most acute in those species of fish that migrate and
swim between the EEZ of a state and the high seas or the EEZs of two states.
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tional organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization. 9 Article 192
obligates states to protect and preserve the marine environ-
mentY.0
Another major accomplishment of UNCLOS is its provi-
sions concerning marine pollution. The prevention of pollution
is extremely important to the entire marine ecosystem. Toxins
and other pollutants not only harm marine mammals directly,
but also endanger their food supply and habitat. Article 194
requires states to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the
marine environment."3 ' Article 1(4) defines "pollution of the
marine environment" as "the introduction by man, directly or
indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environ-
ment,... which results or is likely to result in such deleteri-
ous effects as harm to living resources and marine
life... .2" Finally, article 87 recognizes fishing as a high
seas freedomY3 However, as with all high seas freedoms,
those engaged in such activities must exercise them with "due
regard" for the interests of other states.'
The protective scheme of the IWC regulations, and any
alleged violation thereunder, is directly related to the relevant
provisions of UNCLOS. Thus, the dispute settlement provi-
sions mentioned above may preclude the United States from
using unilateral economic sanctions to protect whales and
other marine mammalsY 5 Any state against whom sanctions
See id. art. 63, 21 I.L.M. at 1283. When these "straddling stocks" are fished exces-
sively on the high seas, the coastal state often objects and threatens unilateral ac-
tion, even though articles 63 and 64 call for multilateral solutions. For a discus-
sion of the unilateralism versus multilateralism debate as it relates to straddling
stocks, see Edward L. Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts:
The Problem of Straddling Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT' L. 343 (1989). Because
of the highly migratory nature of many whale species, the southern ocean sanctu-
ary is not a panacea to protect the whales that summer there, for example.
229. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
230. Id. art. 192, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
231. Id. art. 194.
232. Id. art. 1(4), 32 I.L.M. at 1271.
233. Id. art. 87(1)(e), 21 I.L.M at 1287.
234. Id. art. 87(2). This includes compliance with other applicable treaties. Id.
art. 87(1).
235. McLaughlin, supra note 161, at 41-42. "If the United States becomes a
party to the Convention and subsequently imposes unilateral trade sanctions on
the fisheries products of another State Party, it is likely that those sanctions will
be challenged under the dispute settlement mechanism." Id. at 42.
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are imposed may claim that the United States did not endeav-
or to settle the dispute in good faith in accordance with the
convention. 86 They may then seek a judgment against the
United States for damages suffered as a result of the unilater-
al sanctions by commencing an action themselves under the
dispute settlement procedures. Since the United States is now
a party, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, such a
judgment would be binding under article 296. While the
preclusive effect of the UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures
on unilateral sanctions is problematic, advocates of whale
protection may come to rely upon the very articles cited above.
First, the substance of the articles regarding marine mammal
protection,"5 highly migratory species, 9 and the preserva-
tion of the marine environment," ° all seem to favor a policy
of cetacean preservation. Thus, the United States or other
states seeking to protect whales can avail themselves of the
dispute settlement procedures to compel compliance with obli-
gations under the Whaling Convention or UNCLOS." l
Although resort to the dispute settlement procedures un-
der UNCLOS may be less efficient and more cumbersome than
unilateral trade sanctions, 2 it is in the current spirit of
236. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 300, 21 I.L.M. at 1326. States are required to
fulfill their obligations under the Convention in good faith. Id.
237. Id. art. 296, 21 I.L.M at 1324. Even though the U.S. Senate has not yet
given its advice and consent, UNCLOS is binding on the United States through
the provisional application of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1994, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Article 7(1)(a) provides for the
Agreement to be applied provisionally pending its entry into force by "States
which have consented to the adoption in the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions... ." Id. art. 7(1)(a). Article 7(2) provides "fall such States and entities
shall apply this Agreement provisionally in accordance with their national or inter-
nal laws and regulations, with effect from 16 November 1994 or the date of signa-
ture, notification of consent or accession, if later." Id. art. 7(2).
238. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 65, 120, 21 I.L.M. at 1282, 1291.
239. Id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
240. Id. arts. 192-237, 21 LL.M. at 1308-16.
241. Charney, supra note 216, at 894-95. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 4,
arts. 279-299, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-26.
242. See McLaughlin, supra note 161, at 25. McLaughlin contrasts the relative
ease with which the United States can impose trade sanctions with the difficult
and often imperfect process of multilateral dispute settlement. He observes that
the U.S. preference for unilateral economic sanctions derives from several factors:
First, it provides a method of achieving policy objectives immediately
with none of the delays inherent in international bilateral or multilateral
negotiations. Second, it is less expensive to implement because the Unit-
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multilateralism to do so. Given the almost universal accep-
tance of the policy of whale preservation discussed in Parts II
and III, a state seeking to further that policy through the
UNCLOS dispute settlement procedure could expect to achieve
some success. An adjudicative body could easily interpret the
salient provisions of UNCLOS to give substantive effect to a
policy of cetacean protection.
Furthermore, while the use of the Pelly Amendment to
embargo fish products may be weakened, the use of the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to exclude from the EEZ the
fishing vessels of those states that diminish the effectiveness of
IWC regulations may be enhanced. Although Packwood-
Magnuson could not be applied in a punitive way, and the
government would need to establish a nexus between the pro-
hibited activity and the goal of whale protection, UNCLOS
recognizes the right of the coastal state to enforce its laws and
regulations in the EEZ.' Specifically, such an exclusion
could be justified in terms of protecting and preserving the
marine environment,' the protection of highly migratory
species,2" and the protection of marine mammals. "
Article 73 permits the coastal state to undertake a broad
range of law enforcement measures in the EEZ. These include
boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings as neces-
sary to enforce its laws adopted in conformity with the conven-
tion." However, a blanket exclusion of all fishing vessels, or
ed States is not required to provide trade-offs and incentives to reach
agreement. Third, and most importantly, a broad spectrum of U.S. politi-
cal constituent groups perceive it as the most effective and, in some in-
stances, the only feasible method to get foreign nations to change their
behavior.
Id. at 25 (footnotes omitted). The problem of delay inherent in multilateral dispute
settlement is abated somewhat by the provisional measures provided for in article
290(6) of UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 290(4)-(6), 21 I.L.M. at 1323.
243. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 73, 21 I.L.M. at 1284. Article 73 recognizes
the right of the coastal state to take enforcement measures "in the exercise of its
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in
the exclusive economic zone . . . ." Id art. 73(1). Denying a state access to U.S.
waters for fishing is a relatively small sanction compared with the potential effect
of Pelly to deny access to the United States market for fish products.
244. The coastal state has 'Jurisdiction ... with regard to ... the protection
and preservation of the marine environment .... " Id. art. 56(l)(b)(iii), 21 I.L.M.
at 1280.
245. Id. art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
246. Id. art. 65.
247. Id. art. 73(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1284.
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even a reduction in a fishing catch allocation of a state merely
because that state engages in whaling activity" probably
cannot be justified under UNCLOS. Such actions would be
punitive and thus a violation of international norms. 9
The legal rationale in UNCLOS that enables states to pass
protective legislation in their EEZ would also allow pro-whal-
ing states to permit whaling in their own EEZ. Article 61 per-
mits the coastal state to determine the allowable catch of liv-
ing resources in its own EEZ based on the best scientific evi-
dence available."0 Thus, Japan and Norway would probably
not violate UNCLOS if they are harvesting whales in their
own EEZ and can support the size of the catch with scientific
evidence that their actions do not rise to the level of over-ex-
ploitationY 1 Since scientists differ on the adverse impact of
whaling, and since a key objective of UNCLOS is the "optimum
utilization of the living resources in the [EEZ]," =2 pro-whal-
ing states could probably justify reasonable exploitation of
whales whose numbers are not clearly endangered.
On balance, however, UNCLOS probably enhances the
policy of whale preservation more than it hinders it. While
unilateral measures are disfavored where multilateral solu-
tions are possible, the substantive provisions of UNCLOS ap-
pear to reinforce marine mammal protection. Absent a test
case it is difficult to determine whether or not the binding
248. Such reduction or exclusion is authorized by Packwood-Magnuson. 16
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1994).
249. Where one state attempts to impose its own laws and policies on other
states, it is placing itself in a superior position vis-a-vis those other states. Puni-
tive actions against other states smacks of a violation of a basic principle of inter-
national law-the equality of states. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 115-17 (4th ed. 1949). "[No
state can claim jurisdiction over another . . . ." Id. at 116. "[The rights of one
state ... are as much entitled to be protected by the law as the rights of any
other . . . ." Id. at 117. In addition, the sovereignty and equality of states implies
that all states have a uniform legal personality. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (1st ed. 1966).
250. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 61(1)-(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1281.
251. See id. Both Japan and Norway assert that a limited harvesting of minke
whales is justified by scientific evidence and that these whales can be found in
their adjacent waters. FORTY-FIFrH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 29; see
also Swinbanks, supra note 142, at 9; MacKenzie, supra note 4, at 22. But see
infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
252. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 62(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1281-82 (albeit "without
prejudice to article 61").
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dispute settlement provisions will further that policy. However,
dispute settlement will probably reflect the almost universal
acceptance of the objective of whale preservation. Nevertheless,
it remains to be seen if this provides a superior, or at least a
workable alternative, to the existing tool of unilateral economic
sanctions.
V. THE INTEGRATION OF LAW AND POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF
WHALING
The previous section demonstrated how the use of unilat-
eral trade measures as an enforcement mechanism to compel
compliance with a policy of whale preservation is perhaps
becoming unworkable. There is every reason to believe that the
policy of free trade will continue to grow as developing coun-.
tries modernize and former Soviet-bloc states privatize their
industries. Furthermore, the GATT, NAFTA and UNCLOS are
strong indicators of the increasing desirability of multilateral
solutions to accomplish international objectives. As President
Clinton, for one, has recognized, the goal of economic growth
through free trade is becoming a paramount driving force."
In GATT and NAFTA (the GATT more so than NAFTA) the
perceptive observer can sense a subtle resistance to, and irrita-
tion with, environmental concerns that may interfere with free
trade. The conclusion that unilateral economic sanctions to
accomplish environmental objectives are undesirable is clear. If
the current trend toward unrestricted trade continues, the
world community will view unilateral economic sanctions such
as those authorized by Pelly, as extreme, and indeed illegal.
How will we further the policy of whale preservation in
the next century? The problem is difficult but not dire. Remem-
ber that the status of whales evolved to the current level of
protection without the imposition of a single sanction under
Pelly. In addition, anti-whaling forces only need to influence
the policy of a very small number of pro-whaling states. Given
the near universal consensus that whale preservation is a
worthy goal, it is highly unlikely that those states that have
253. See President's Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 2139, 2140 (Dec. 8, 1993);
President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 2180, 2180 (Dec. 15, 1993).
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already ended the practice will resume. The task of influencing
the policies of the few remaining whaling states is much less
formidable today after the years of public relations successes of
the "Save the Whales" and other environmental movements.
The future policy should involve not only legal remedies, but
also political, economic and scientific solutions.
A. Political Measures
Political measures and incentives should be used wherever
possible to convince the few remaining whaling states that
they should abandon commercial whaling.' For these argu-
ments to be feasible, however, the pro-whaling community
must identify credible alternatives to the economic benefits of
whaling. One suggestion is to provide inducements to convert
the whaling industry from a "whale-hunting" into a "whale-
watching" industryY5 Although there are no guarantees of
economic equivalence from one to the other, whale-watching is
a growing tourist attraction world-wide. 6 Such a conversion
requires more of a change of attitude than a technical or indus-
trial modification.
254. Political pressure was unsuccessfully brought to bear against Norway when
it applied for admission into the European Community in 1992. David D. Caron,
The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal
Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 154, 166-68 (1995); see Norway's Application for Membership: Opinion
of the Commission, COM(93)142 final at 19 thereinafter Norway's Application]. At
negotiations for membership in April 1993, Norway was specifically warned that
"the issue of whaling... will need to be addressed and that ... this issue will
require . . . very careful consideration during the negotiation." Norway's Applica-
tion, supra, at 19; see Peter G.G. Davies, Legality of Norwegian Commercial Whal-
ing Under the Whaling Convention and Its Compatibility with European Communi-
ty Law, 43 INTL & ComP. L.Q. 270, 271 (1994) (discussing these negotiations). In
the wake of Norway's November 1994 vote not to join the European Union, the
issue is now moot. Caron, supra, at 167.
255. FORTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 174, at 23-24, 33-34. A
proposal by the U.K. delegate to study the practice of whale-watching as a "sus-
tainable use" of cetacean resources passed into resolution at the 44th annual meet-
ing of the IWC in 1992. Id. at 23. A "Working Group on Whale-Watching" had a
preliminary exchange of information at the 46th annual meeting. FORTY-FIFTH
REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 32-33. It is necessary to study the impact
and possible negative effects of extensive whale-watching on cetacean habitat and
behavior.
256. Recreational whale-watching is considered a growing aspect of the tourism
industry with global revenues rising an average of 49% each year. FORTY-FOURTH
REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 174, at 23.
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The United States enjoys good relations with Norway,
Iceland, and Japan to emphasize the potential of positive op-
tions available. Apart from the IWC, there are many areas of
agreement and cooperation that may provide opportunities for
meaningful negotiation on the whaling issue.
In addition to incentives to change, states concerned about
continued whaling should use diplomatic protests even if the
hunting activity is in technical compliance with the Whaling
Convention. Whaling states surely cannot enjoy their isolation
on this issue, and others should remind them at every opportu-
nity. So too, whaling states have thus far been unconvincing in
their claim that whaling is central to their economies or cul-
tures. Political measures could go a long way toward convinc-
ing those states it is in their interest to abandon whaling.
Finally, as the global environment becomes a greater con-
cern, the United Nations will likely play an ever-increasing
role in its protection. Concerned states should introduce resolu-
tions in the General Assembly calling for a permanent ban on
whaling consistent with the goals of the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development."5 In 1982 the
United Nations Environment Program made similar state-
ments calling for the whaling moratorium.1 8 In 1984 it sug-
gested additional programs for the identification, conservation,
and management of cetacean resources.259 These political
pressures should continue and increase until they prove fully
successful.
B. Economic Measures
Concerned states and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) should employ economic incentives as well. While
unilateral economic sanctions to punish conduct are disfavored,
economic incentives to encourage certain conduct should not
run afoul of the trade treaty regime. For example, to expand
on the "whale-watching" proposal discussed above, the states of
the European Union could establish a European Whale-Watch-
ing industry and offer to subsidize Norway's participation for
257. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
258. U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, Implementation of the Recommendations of
the 1972 Conference, 1982 U.N.Y.B. 998, 998, U.N. Sales No. E.85.I.1.
259. U.N. ENVIRONIENT PROGRAM, Marine Mammals: Global Plan of Action,
1984 U.N.Y.B. 650, U.N. Sales No. E.87.I.1.
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five years if it agrees to abandon its commercial whaling ambi-
tions. The subsidy contemplated here is to encourage participa-
tion in a European Union project (one that happens to be prof-
itable) and not to protect a fledgling domestic industry in the
traditional sense of a subsidy. Thus, such a subsidy would not
violate the spirit of free trade agreements. The states con-
cerned must make a commitment to absorb the impact of eco-
nomic displacement caused by the loss of jobs in the whaling
sector. Retraining would certainly play a key role. Robust econ-
omies like Japan and Norway should be able to absorb this
tiny sector with little difficulty, especially if they receive eco-
nomic and political incentives to do so.
In 1986 the Reagan administration and the Japanese
government may have set a precedent for introducing the
whaling issue into other areas of international commerce. 6
The whaling issue could be added to the agenda at other nego-
tiations where fishery allocations and commercial exploitation
of other marine resources are discussed. While this strategy
may marginally deprive whales of their special character de-
scribed in Part HI, it provides an additional opportunity to
influence the few remaining whaling states.
Finally, if the President of the United States cannot apply
the Pelly Amendment to embargo the fishery products of a pro-
whaling state for fear of violating U.S. obligations under the
GATT, the power of the consumer is not similarly constrained.
Consumer boycotts are not only possible, but often highly ef-
fective where the public supports an issue to a point of mobili-
zation.26' A resumption of commercial whaling may give rise
to that level of public outrage if footage of whales being butch-
ered is readily available. Whales have a great public image.
The public relates to whales through friendly images in the
media and marine life parks, such as Sea World. A well-engi-
neered public relations campaign to encourage the general
public to save whales with a boycott of products from Japan or
Norway may influence those states to re-evaluate their practic-
es.262 During the Tuna-Dolphin controversy, a similar con-
260. DAY, supra note 1, at 128-30. David Day suggests that the admin-
istration's real purpose in the use of the whaling issue in the negotiations was to
gain leverage with Japan on other aspects of bilateral trade. Id. at 128. See gener-
ally Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
261. See Ross, supra note 158, at 364-65.
262. DAY, supra note 1, at 120. Day describes the use of consumer boycotts in
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sumer boycott was regarded as quite successful."es
C. Scientific Measures
The more scientists learn and teach us about whales, the
harder it is to view them as nothing more than a commercial
resource. Article 239 of UNCLOS calls upon states and inter-
national organizations to promote and facilitate the develop-
ment and conduct of marine scientific research.2 4 Part III
discussed some scientific research findings that indicate
whales are intelligent, sentient, communicative beings. There
is much to be learned about whales from non-lethal basic sci-
entific research. Can we understand their method of communi-
cation? Is meaningful inter-species communication possible?
What can we learn about their social units? Since both Japan
and Norway have expressed an interest in "scientific whal-
ing,"  perhaps they can be convinced of the potential bene-
fits from non-lethal research. Replacing a lethal scientific
whaling program with a non-lethal program would alleviate
some of the economic displacement that would result from an
abandonment of whaling operations.
The IWC and its member states should investigate and
the Save the Whales movement in less than enthusiastic terms. He cautions:
"Save a Whale - Harpoon a Toyota" may seem a viable tactic, but
most conservationist groups find blanket [consumer] boycotts extreme-
ly difficult to initiate and oversee, and even more difficult to call off
once begun. Furthermore, they do not particularly wish to penalize
industries just because they happen to be Japanese.
Id.
263. Consumer outrage over the Tuna-Dolphin controversy led to enactment of
The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994). The
Act makes it a civil offense to misrepresent that tuna has been caught in a "dol-
phin safe" manner where it was harvested on the high seas by a vessel engaged
in driftnet fishing or was harvested in the Eastern Tropical Pacific by a vessel
using purse-seine nets that encircle dolphins. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(e). For a basic dis-
cussion of consumer power as environmental protector, see Ross, supra note 158,
at 364-65.
264. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 239, 21 I.L.M. at 1316.
265. FORTY-FITH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 29. Resolutions were
passed asking Japan and Norway to reconsider their research whaling programs.
Id. Interestingly, article 240 of UNCLOS, titled General Principles for the Conduct
of Marine Scientific Research, requires that "marine scientific research ... be
conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with
this Convention including those for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment." UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 240(d), 21 I.L.M. at 1316. Does lethal
scientific whaling violate this provision?
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consider international programs to support non-lethal research.
The 1994 resolution declaring the meat and products from
research whaling (lethal research) as no longer available for
export makes this initiative particularly important.266 The
non-lethal study of whales should also include comprehensive
research about their entire ecosystem and food supply. Thus,
scientists should explore all the potential threats to their exis-
tence from non-commercial sources. This relates generally to
the global problem of marine pollution. The world community
generally would benefit from the findings of such studies.
Furthermore, any state that insists upon engaging in any
type of whaling operation, including aboriginal whaling, should
be prepared to come forward with competent scientific data
that the stocks of the species they are pursuing can readily
support the hunt. 7 The Scientific Committee of the IWC is
currently developing a Revised Management Procedure that
will provide a more effective inspection and observation
scheme to determine whale populations.268 This will ultimate-
ly make it more difficult for whale hunters to harvest an en-
dangered species.
D. Legal Measures
All of the political, economic, and scientific measures listed
above have been part of the arsenal of anti-whaling forces, in
one form or another, since the whaling debate began. The real
challenge in the future will be to effectively operate within the
framework of multilateralism which will surely prevail in the
next century. As discussed in Part IV, the best such opportuni-
ty is the dispute resolution procedure of UNCLOSY9 All
states, especially important maritime states like Japan and
Norway, have an interest in giving effect to the substantive
provisions of UNCLOS. The review of the relevant UNCLOS
provisions in Part IV, as well as the current position of the
IWC, indicates that cetaceans and other marine mammals
266. FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 44-45. Previously 49%
of the meat derived from scientific whaling was available for export. NMFS Re-
port, supra note 38, para. 7. The resolution also called upon governments to report
on smuggling cases. FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IWC, supra note 4, at 45.
267. Hankins, supra note 145, at 530.
268. See FORTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE IW, supra note 4, at 23-27.
269. UNCLOS, supra note 4, arts. 279-299, 21 I.L.M. at 1322-26.
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deserve special protection. In addition, article 61 allows each
coastal state to determine the allowable catch of the living
resources in its own EEZY.2 " Thus, coastal states can declare
huge segments of the ocean "off limits" to whalers. The whal-
ing states will need to rely on the many freedoms and protect-
ions of UNCLOS. These states will find it increasingly difficult
for them to "pick and choose" among the provisions if they
believe that, on balance, they benefit from the regime. The fact
that UNCLOS does not permit reservations is important be-
cause it requires member states to accept the whole treaty,
even those elements that they may not like.2 1'
Even if future whaling operations occur only in the EEZ of
the whaling state and are in technical compliance with the
Whaling Convention (because of the "opt-out" provision), such
actions might still be adjudicated to be in violation of
UNCLOS. Specifically, article 63 governing straddling
stocks, 272 and article 64 governing highly migratory spe-
cies, 73 may be violated unless the species of whale harvested
can be found only in the EEZ of that state. Article 116(b) ex-
tends these obligations to states that fish on the high seas.274
270. Id. art. 61(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1281. It has been observed, however, that the
lack of any meaningful definition of the term "conservation" will be a source of
controversy in the future. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 119 (1992); see id. at 123-24.
271. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 309, 21 I.L.M. at 1327 ("No reservations or
exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other
articles of this Convention."). The Vienna Convention permits a state to formulate
a reservation when signing, ratifying, approving or acceding to a treaty unless the
reservation is prohibited by the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art.
19(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336. To some extent, states which become parties to
UNCLOS are attempting to circumvent the "all or nothing" strictures of article
309 of UNCLOS by filing "understandings," "declarations," or "interpretations"
when they ratify it. Often these amount to de facto "reservations." These "declara-
tions and statements" are permitted by article 310 "provided that such declara-
tions or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the
provisions of this Convention in their application to that State." UNCLOS, supra
note 4, art. 310, 21 I.L.M. at 1327.
272. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 63, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
273. Id. art. 64.
274. Id. art. 116, 21 I.L.M. at 1290. Article 116 provides:
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the
high seas subject to:
(a) their treaty obligations;
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States
provided for.., in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to
67 ....
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These articles require cooperation among the states concerned
to ensure conservation of those stocks.275 If the whaling state
has opted out of the conservation scheme of the IWC, the ap-
propriate international organization, it may be violating its
duty to cooperate in the conservation of those stocks. In other
words, simply opting out of the moratorium could be a deroga-
tion of the duty under UNCLOS to cooperate in conservation.
Moreover, articles 65 and 120 grant marine mammals, and
cetaceans in particular, even greater protection through the
appropriate international organization, the IWC.276 Thus,
UNCLOS not only seems to further the policy of cetacean pro-
tection in a substantive way, but also defers to the expertise of
the IWC to do so on a technical level. Therefore, the effect of
the "opt-out" provision of the Whaling Convention may be
minimized.
In addition to the opportunity provided through UNCLOS,
the CITES treaty277 can play a larger role to prevent pirate
whaling and eliminate the transport of whale products illegally
across international borders. Although CITES has nearly elimi-
nated the overt commercial trade, it is the duty of each mem-
ber state to eliminate the black market trade by its nation-
als.278 All states, regardless of whether they are a party to
CITES, should aggressively enforce their domestic laws to
punish those engaged in the illegal trade of whale products.
Pro-whaling states should do so as well, as a display of good
faith in the whaling debate. Modern scientific techniques are
available: DNA testing may be used to test whether or not
whale meat is from an endangered species.27
CITES is specifically enumerated in NAFTA as providing
Id.
275. Id. arts. 63-64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
276. Id. arts. 65, 120, 21 I.L.M. at 1282, 1291.
277. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
278. Id. art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1101-03, 993 U.N.T.S. at 250-51. Article VIII of
CITES requires that "[tihe Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the
provisions of the present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in viola-
tion thereof. These shall include measures ... to penalize trade in, or possession
of, such specimens, or both .. . ." Id. art. VIII(1)(a); see Karl J. Liwo, Note, The
Continuing Significance of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora During the 1990's, 15 SuFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
122, 125 (1991).
279. DNA Tests for Suspect Whale Trade, supra note 38, at 11.
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obligations which may supersede those in NAFTA itself.28
The United States should embrace this concept in the negotia-
tion of future trade treaties. The Whaling Convention can be
incorporated into future trade agreements to suspend free
trade obligations in the interest of whale protection.
This is not likely to occur, however, as long as Japan re-
mains such a large trading partner. Similarly, the amendment
of existing obligations under the GATT to include the use of
unilateral trade sanctions would prove to be a near impossible
task. Article 30 of the GATT requires a two-thirds vote of all
members to amend any provision of the agreement.281 Since
unilateral measures to protect the environment are strongly
disfavored in the realm of international trade, the possibility of
a two-thirds majority of states is most likely unattainable."2
The idea of side-agreements, however, like the states parties
achieved with NAFTA, may prove a workable alternative to
the problem.
Advocates of whale preservation do not necessarily need to
fear multilateral dispute settlement regarding the whaling
issue. Multilateral decisions will likely reflect the almost uni-
versal consensus that cetaceans deserve special protection.
This may not be the case, however, if unilateral sanctions are
imposed and later need to be justified before an international
tribunal. By burdening international trade, even for a "good
cause," the debate would shift-the United States would be the
"bad guy."
At the same time, the United States should consider using
the unilateral trade sanctions as a last resort. Congress re-
tained the right to do so in both GATT" and NAFTA.M An
important difference exists, however, between the use of uni-
lateral sanctions to further a multilateral goal and a purely
domestic one. The use of a unilateral trade sanction to further
a multilateral agreement, such as the Whaling Convention, is
less of an assault to multilateralism than when it is applied
pursuant to a purely domestic statute such as the Marine
Mammal Protection Act or the Endangered Species Act. None-
280. NAFTA, supra note 6, art. 104(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 297-98.
281. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXX(1), 61 Stat. at A74, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282.
282. See Ross, supra note 158, at 358-60.
283. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(B) (1994).
284. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(2)(B) (1994).
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theless, other states that value unrestricted trade would no
doubt disapprove of such an action. In the final analysis it is
reduced to a question of values: Does our interest in protecting
whales equal our goal of economic growth through free trade?
If no workable alternative to trade sanctions can be imple-
mented, we must address this question.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite a long history of commercial whaling and weak
international attempts to regulate it, whales have progressive-
ly gained protection in international and domestic law. Al-
though the protection of whales has not yet achieved the status
of customary law, binding all states, a clear trend exists in
that direction. Should the few remaining whaling states decide
that the constant battle in the international arena is not cost-
effective for them, they will likely abandon their commercial
whaling industries. If so, the anti-whaling forces will finally
have won the war.
Until then, the United States and other members of the
IWC must endeavor to find enforcement mechanisms that do
not run afoul of obligations in free trade agreements. The use
of unilateral trade sanctions to compel compliance with IWC
regulations is becoming unworkable. We should negotiate fu-
ture trade treaties in contemplation of trade sanctions to fur-
ther the policy of whale preservation. All states that seek to
protect whales should not only aggressively enforce their do-
mestic laws but also work with the world community to accom-
plish this goal. The best such opportunity to address this prob-
lem between and among states is through the UNCLOS dis-
pute settlement procedure.
Although the right of whales to swim the oceans freely,
unmolested by human beings has not yet been achieved, the
anti-whaling forces should feel increasingly pleased. They have
changed the terms of the debate from regulation to protection
to preservation. The next century will provide challenges to the
policy of preservation, but with those challenges will come
further opportunities to protect whales in international law.
While the world community has not yet guaranteed that
whales have a right to roam the world's oceans without risk of
being hunted, it is moving in that direction.
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